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ARTICLES
JUSTICE HOLMES'S PHILOSOPHY
SHELDON M. NOVICK*
I. SUMMARY
The memory of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has been recruited by
nearly every movement or school of jurisprudence since his death in
1935, and as a result confusion lingers over what his ideas were, and
what value they might have for us now. The most persistent effort has
been to portray Holmes as a pragmatist, although his views are best de-
scribed as "scientific realism," the direct opposite-if pragmatism can
have an opposite.
Some of the confusion has arisen because Holmes described ordinary
lawyers and judges as pragmatic; he thought the common law they fash-
ioned was an instrument of social policy, the result of experimentation.
But Holmes, as scholar and judge, held himself aloof from these ordinary
values. He thought a judge's duty was to preside over the great peaceful
conflicts of the marketplace, and to decide fairly who and what would
prevail in the struggle for life-to choose between pragmatisms, as it
were.
The two codes of duty-the rules of conduct imposed on the crowd,
and the special duties of the gentleman judge-seem to be in conflict, and
this is the tension that commentators on Holmes have often found in his
work. But Holmes harmonized the two codes of duty to his own satisfac-
tion in a larger, personal philosophy that he called "mystical material-
ism," a faith in the ultimate ends of an evolving, material world. The
judge's duty was to serve the process of evolution, even though this
might require him to condemn his own society as unfit.
Holmes's jurisprudence reflected his philosophy. The common law
* Scholar in Residence, Vermont Law School. The author is grateful for assistance from the
Permanent Committee on the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise; from the Harvard Law School library
and their generously helpful staff for access to the Holmes papers and permission to quote from
them; to Claire Reinhardt and Karen McLaughlin; and to Judge Richard A. Posner and Professor
Albert W. Alschuler, for helpful comments and suggestions. The author alone is responsible for the
views expressed in this article, however.
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was the deposit of an evolving society, moving toward self-awareness and
conscious control of its own further evolution. The Constitution, how-
ever, embodied only relatively fundamental principles in which Holmes
found the judge's duty to ensure that the struggle for life was carried out
peacefully and fairly.
Holmes expressed his ideas obscurely, which is surprising, because his
ambition was to be remembered as a thinker. He told Anna Lyman Gray
that he would not have done much more than walk across the street to be
promoted from Justice to Chief Justice, but that he wanted to be
remembered as the greatest legal thinker who had ever lived.' It was a
complex ambition, for he wished also to be an artist and a gentleman, as
if to combine Sir Philip Sydney and Baruch Spinoza, whose qualities he
believed ordinarily were incompatible.
To reconcile them, Holmes chose to embed his philosophical discover-
ies in forms acceptable to polite society. Poetry, he found, was not his
medium, but he was a brilliant conversationalist; and so, odd as it seems,
he spun out his theories in sparkling talk and courtly letters to young
women-which for the most part have never been published. Later he
set these theories in more precisely faceted, formal addresses, delivered to
surely somewhat startled audiences in rural New Hampshire and Massa-
chusetts. He presented nicely bound copies of his Speeches 2 to English
women from good families; and, eventually, his most carefully tested
ideas could be seen moving beneath the surface of his judicial opinions.
This method precluded anything so dull and underbred as an explana-
tion-not that there was any secret about his ideas. "Spinoza is the
boy," he wrote to Felix Frankfurter, ". . . he sees the world as I see it-
and he alone of all the old ones that I know." 3 But Spinoza's quasi-
mathematical deductions, like all formal systems, were boring and vul-
nerable to attack. To the philosopher Morris R. Cohen, whom he greatly
admired, Holmes wrote in his best swordsman's manner: "Systems are
forgotten-only a man's apergus are remembered. I used to say, extrav-
agantly of course, that Kant could have told his main points to a young
lady in ten minutes after dinner."4
1. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Anna L. Gray (Dec. 2, 1910), in Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Papers, Harvard Law School Library B32 F5 [hereinafter Holmes Papers].
2. OLIVER W. HOLMES, SPEECHES (5th ed. 1913).
3. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 15, 1929), in Holmes Papers,
supra note 1, at B29 F12.
4. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Morris R. Cohen (Aug. 31, 1920), in LEONORA C. Ro-
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So Holmes never made any systematic presentation of his thought. He
labored patiently at technical philosophy-in a hotel room with no books
available, he wrote out a careful outline of Kant's Critique of Pure Rea-
son ' for Mrs. Gray-but he did not emulate the academic philosophers.
Impact, not dead pull, did the job, he liked to say. He found and care-
fully polished a few images that conveyed his meaning, but were highly
resistant to analysis or refutation. He compared these images to a com-
plicated mechanism that had gradually been refined into a single,
smooth, oddly shaped brass part.
In my biography of Justice Holmes6 it seemed proper to let him have
his effects. But explanation also has its part to play, if only below decks;
so while Holmes lightly touches the helm, we may now trudge down to
the engine room and have a look at the machinery. Most revealing of
Holmes's thought have been his earliest law writings, published anony-
mously and until recently not identified as his, and the thousands of his
still unpublished letters that I have reviewed as Holmes's biographer and
as editor of the first edition of Holmes's collected works.
II. EARLY INFLUENCES
Holmes's father, the doctor, for whom he was named, was an eight-
eenth century man, an optimist, and an admirer of Leibniz; we must im-
agine him debating the ideas of the Age of Reason with his young son.
The doctor's, The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table, published in 1858,
began with a combative exchange over Leibniz between the Autocrat and
a "divinity student"-a transparent disguise for his serious, seventeen-
year-old son.7
The doctor believed in reason, and was something of a skeptic in reli-
gion. But he liked to reserve a little green-room for free will, and kept an
SENFIELD, PORTRAIT OF A PHILOSOPHER: MORRIS R. COHEN IN LIFE AND LETTERS 327-28 (1962)
[hereinafter HOLMES-COHEN LETTERS].
5. Holmes Papers, supra note 1.
6. SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
(1989).
7. OLIVER W. HOLMES [SR.], THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE (Boston, Ticknor
& Fields eds., 1858). Six years later, in 1864, Wendell, by then an infantry officer in the Union Army
in winter quarters, triumphantly concluded the debate by showing that 1 + 1= 2 was not necessarily
true in all imaginable worlds-and then characteristically refuting his own argument. Letter from
Oliver W. Holmes to his father (Apr. 18, 1864) and undated fragment of second letter, in OLIVER
W. HOLMES, TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR. 1861-1864 at 95-97 (Mark DeW. Howe ed., 1946).
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open mind on spiritualism and whether Bacon wrote Shakespeare. As
the son said later:
[There was with him as with the rest of his generation a certain softness of
attitude toward the interstitial miracle ... that I did not feel. The differ-
ence was in the air, although perhaps only the few of my time felt it. The
Origin of Species I think came out when I was in college-H. Spencer an-
nounced his intention to put the universe into our pockets-I hadn't read
either of them to be sure, but as I say it was in the air. I did read Buckles-
now almost forgotten-but making a noise in his day.... Emerson and
Ruskin were the men that set me on fire. Probably a sceptical temperament
that I got from my mother had something to do with my way of thinking.
Then I was in with the abolitionists, some or many of whom were sceptics
as well as dogmatists. But I think science was at the bottom. 9
The scientific atmosphere was a wind sweeping in from Germany.
Holmes's friends Henry and William James, and Henry and Brooks Ad-
ams, made their pilgrimages to German universities. Ralph Waldo
Emerson and Henry James, Sr. joined the St. Louis Philosophical Soci-
ety, which sought to combine Hegel and American transcendentalism.10
"Science" in this world meant two things. First, as in socialist countries,
"science" meant the study of hidden, fundamental forces or principles of
history. Emerson said:
Beside all the small reasons we assign, there is a great reason for the exist-
ence of every extant fact; a reason which lies grand and immovable, often
unsuspected, behind it in silence. The Times are the masquerade of the
Eternities; trivial to the dull, tokens of noble and majestic agents to the
wise; the receptacle in which the Past leaves its history; the quarry out of
which the genius of to-day is building up the Future. 11
8. Henry Thomas Buckle's, HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND (1857-61) had an im-
mense impact on English Liberal thought. Buckle attempted to frame a science of history, showing
the development of civilization in response to "laws" of climate and geography.
9. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Morris R. Cohen (Feb. 5, 1919), in HOLMES-COHEN
LETTERS, supra note 4, at 321. Holmes's diaries for the period 1864-1872 show that he had read
Spencer. See infra note 29. Compare the very similar statement, in less personal terms, by John
Acton, Holmes's English contemporary: "Expressions like: the growth of language, physiology of
the State, national psychology, the mind of the Church, the development of Platonism, the con-
tinuity of law-questions which occupy half the mental activity of our age-were unintelligible to
the eighteenth century-to Hume, Johnson, Smith, Diderot." John Aston, quoted in MICHAEL
OAKESHOTr, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 152 n.1 (1962). Oakeshott properly
adds that these concepts have since become unintelligible again.
10. Richard Hyland, Hegel: A User's Manual, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1735, 1763 (1989). I am
indebted to Joanne Ertel for calling this article to my attention.
11. Ralph W. Emerson, 1 The Times, in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 80, 80 (1929).
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Seventy years later, Holmes, reflecting on his own career, said, "My chief
interest in the law has been in the effort to show the universal in the
particular-That has kept me alive."' 2 In this view, Plato and Kant
were figures in the history of science.
Second, science meant evolution. Scientific inquiry into the spirit of
the time showed that the world was developing, progressing, through the
struggle of contending ideas. Both Emerson and Carlyle inspired
Holmes with their vivid pictures of history as evolution, as the embodi-
ment of advancing ideas, and with their implicit call to heroic accom-
plishment. As to Carlyle, Holmes read and admired both The French
Revolution and Sartor Resartus. When his father asked him the parlor-
game question-what book he would take with him to a desert island-
Holmes answered, "The French Revolution. " "3
But Emerson was the great inspiration of Holmes's development. One
cannot trace particular ideas in Holmes's later works to Emerson, but the
older man certainly inspired Holmes to write, and confirmed in him the
attitudes and assumptions that were the context of his work. In the
1850s, when Holmes was in his teens, he saw Emerson on the other side
of the street. He ran over and said, "If I ever do anything, I shall owe a
great deal of it to you."14 In middle life, when he had written the first
article setting out his mature philosophy of law, he sent a copy to
Emerson:
It seems to me that I have learned, after a laborious and somewhat painful
period of probation, that the law opens a way to philosophy as well as any-
thing else, if pursued far enough, and I hope to prove it before I die. Accept
this little piece as written in that faith, and as [a] slight mark of the grati-
tude and respect I feel for you who more than anyone else first started the
philosophical ferment in my mind. 15
Near the end of his life, Holmes said, "The only firebrand of my youth
that bums to me as brightly as ever is Emerson."' 6
12. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Morris R. Cohen (Aug. 31, 1920), in HOLMES-COHEN
LETrERS, supra note 4, at 328.
13. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Canon Patrick A. Sheehan (Oct. 27, 1912), in HOLMES-
SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE: THE LETTERS OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND CANON
PATRICK AUGUSTINE SHEEHAN 51 (David H. Burton ed., 1976) [hereinafter HOLMES-SHEEHAN
LETTERS].
14. Id.
15. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Ralph W. Emerson, in Emerson Papers, Houghton Li-
brary, Harvard; Holmes Papers, supra note I, at B42 F20; quoted in NOVICK, supra note 6, at 149.
16. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 20, 1930), in 2 OLIVER W.
HOLMES, HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR
1992]
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Emerson encouraged Holmes to exercise his individual judgment and
to test all tradition by his own measure; he embodied the solitary search
for principle that to Holmes was the scientific method. He also intro-
duced Holmes to Plato, another lasting influence in manifold ways.
Holmes-who was always a good example of Harold Bloom's anxiety of
influence-reacted by opposing Plato's and Emerson's idealism, but he
bore the marks of their method all his life. He became especially com-
mitted to the Socratic techniques of investigation-the reductio ad ab-
surdum above all. This became his characteristic test of arguments, in
law as in philosophy. Rights, for instance, were not ultimate, because
taken to their extremes they were absurd; only the power of the state
could be extended without limit and without contradiction.
Holmes summarized his understanding of this world view in two es-
says, which he wrote during the summer following his junior year at col-
lege. In an essay on Plato, he described philosophy as a search for
empirical principles in the material world, and Plato as an early, outmo-
ded scientist.17 In a simultaneous essay on Diirer, he used his under-
standing of scientific principles to describe the development of art, as
shown in the evolution of engraving technique and subject matter.18 In
this remarkable essay, Holmes treated works of art-as he would later
treat judicial opinions-as unconscious expressions of the mentality of
their time. The scientific historian, studying these data, rather than the
artist, could see the principles being revealed.
From his mother, Holmes acquired what he called a skeptical temper-
ament, by which he seemed to mean a sense of acceptance of what was
immediately given and doubt of anything that did not seem obvious. He
also acquired from her a rigid sense of duty, a sense of obligation to
accomplish something definite in each twenty-four hours. She smiled on
his abolitionism, and for his twentieth birthday, on the eve of the Civil
War, she gave him a life of Sir Philip Sydney, the chivalric model of a
gentleman. Holmes believed in scientific evolutionism as the latest stage
in the development of philosophy, and so he believed that science would
find a new justification for morality and duty. He was two generations
removed from orthodox Christianity; his table of duties was taken not
from the Bible, but from the code of chivalry. Like many in his time and
FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 264 (Mark Dew. Howe ed., 1941) [hereinafter HOLMES-POL-
LOCK LETTERS].
17. Oliver W. Holmes, Plato, 2 UNIv. L.Q. 205 (1860).
18. Oliver W. Holmes, Notes on Albert Durer, 7 HARV. MAG. 41 (1860).
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circumstances, the manners of a gentleman were his true morality; how-
ever, he had more candor and self-awareness in this matter than most.
His mother was pleased when he enlisted in the Union Army; at first,
his father, who was not an abolitionist, was not pleased. But, when the
war had begun in earnest, the doctor became quite ruthless. After three
years of infantry combat, thrice wounded and often ill, Holmes wished to
leave the army. Both his parents then urged him to reenlist until the
war's end, although that seemed to him to mean almost certain death.
He began the war with a sense that duty meant ultimate self-sacrifice,
Tennyson's "do and die," and at first he was willing, but he could not
continue. He grew weary, and he grew older. In the third year of com-
bat he left his regiment-one of its few surviving officers-for a safer staff
position. In the winter of 1863-1864, at relative leisure in staff headquar-
ters, he talked compulsively with fellow officers. He composed a series of
essays, trying to make philosophic sense of his experiences in battle. Ap-
parently, he was trying to understand and explain the duty to sacrifice
oneself, which he increasingly viewed in the abstract, and from a
distance.
He destroyed nearly all of these notebooks, but enough can be gath-
ered from the remaining fragments and his letters of that time to show he
came out of the army a thorough materialist, and a mechanist, who
thought that human beings acted largely on unconscious impulses. The
war taught him that government was founded on violence. Like the vet-
erans of a later war, he ended with a deep-seated existentialist conviction
that there was no external or absolute moral order and that he was free
to be what he chose.
In the end, he came to feel that his true duty was in the development of
these philosophical ideas, rather than in the anonymous death which
awaited him in the army. With this rationale to comfort him, he left the
war after his first term of enlistment had ended, and his regiment had
ceased to exist.
III. EARLY WRITINGS
Despite Holmes's determination to pursue philosophy (and art), his
father made it plain that he would have to earn a living, and Holmes
trained for the bar. But law school was a perfunctory affair then and
Holmes's diaries and letters of the time show that he was principally
immersed in philosophy.
19921
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No record of Holmes's conversation and only a few of his letters from
this period exist today. His diaries contain a list of his readings,19 but it
is unlikely that Holmes was ever deeply influenced by a book. The read-
ing list is a record, not of influences, but of a preconceived program of
study which suggests both his interest and, apparently, the conclusion he
hoped to reach. He read the utilitarian writers, principally Austin and
Mill, but nearly all the reading was historical or on the theory of evolu-
tion. He read a number of histories of philosophy: the Hegelian histo-
rian of law, von Savigny; the French anthropologist of ancient law,
Fustel de Coulanges; Henry Maine's evolutionist account, Ancient Law;
and Stirling's Secret of Hegel. He read Herbert Spencer's First Principles
of evolutionary philosophy and Chauncey Wright's approving review of
Spencer's works in the North American Review. Holmes warmly recalled
Wright's influence, who confirmed his belief that logical arguments were
not absolute. As he had told his father, one could not say "necessary" to
the cosmos. Holmes probably also read and heard Chauncey Wright ar-
guing that consciousness resulted from material, mechanistic evolution.20
In addition to history and evolution, Holmes read a good deal of Kant,
and of post-Kantian investigations into the structure of language and
thought. He reread Hamilton's version of Kant, and Mill's commentary
on Hamilton's Kant. Holmes read Alexander Bain on the psychological
basis of logic, and Pictet's study in French of Indo-European Origins: An
Essay in Linguistic Paleontology. He seemed to be heading toward an
evolutionary account of the basic ideas or structures of thought; some-
thing like Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology, published serially in
the 1870s, which described among many other things the evolution of
"primitive ideas" of animistic societies. He seemed to be heading, in fact,
for The Common Law.
In 1866, he visited England to complete his education. All of his com-
plex ambition was excited and confirmed on this journey. In the first of
the many London seasons in which he would swim, he found himself at
home among the gentry, and in a parlor-game described himself as a sort
of Sir Walter Raleigh.21 During two weeks of climbing in the Alps he
formed a long and intimate friendship with Leslie Stephen, and certainly
19. Published with very helpful annotations by Eleanor Little, The Early Reading of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, 8 HARV. LIBR. BULL. 163 (1954).
20. See Chauncey Wright, Evolution of Self-Consciousness, 116 N. AM. REv. 245 (Apr. 1873).
21. See NovICK, supra note 6, at 112-13.
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had his philosophical readings confirmed.2 2 Stephen, nine years his se-
nior and a gifted teacher, had himself embarked on a long struggle to
replace his lost religion with a belief in Darwinist evolution.23
There was an intermission in Holmes's philosophic studies from 1867
to 1872, while he served as an editor of the new American Law Review
and edited the twelfth edition of Chancellor James Kent's Commentaries
on American Law. 24 He brought a historical, philosophic perspective to
his writings on the law; by 1873, in The Gas-Stokers' Strike,25 Holmes
gave an explicitly Darwinist description of law. He said that law was
always an expression of the self-interest of the dominant forces in the
community. Any other law, and indeed any other social institution,
would be extinguished by the force of natural selection. If law was sim-
ply the rule of the temporary victor in the struggle for survival, he noted,
then it was not consistent with the Liberal, utilitarian assumption of the
"solidarity of society." There was no greatest good of the greatest
number for law to serve, only the survival interests of the strongest fac-
tion, tempered by a civilized sympathy.
As his very frequent citations to Maine, Savigny, and Jhering attested,
there was nothing distinctively his own about this evolutionism, which in
Holmes's scheme was very awkwardly married to a system of arrange-
ment of the law according to duties.26 Holmes was struggling, as yet
unsuccessfully, toward a study of law on scientific principles that would
be similar to his brief study of Diirer's engravings. He had learned an
immense amount about the common law, and he had achieved critical
insights about the nature of law and how judges did their work. The law
was what judges did, in particular circumstances. No one, not even the
judges, could consciously state the principles on which they were acting
at the time. Only after study of numerous decisions could one expose the
unconscious forces at work.2 7 The scholar was a scientist, delving into
the fossilized remains of the law, trying to trace the lines of its
22, Id. at 108-10.
23. See generally, NOEL ANNAN, LESLIE STEPHEN: THE GODLESS VICTORIAN (1984). Lord
Annan's classic evocation of the intellectual world in which Stephen moved is immensely helpful for
an understanding of Holmes.
24. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (Oliver W. Holmes ed., 12th ed.
1873).
25. 7 AM. L. REV. 582 (1873).
26. See Oliver W. Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REv. 1 (1870);
The Arrangement of the Law-Privity, 7 AM. L. REV. 46 (1872).
27. Holmes, supra note 26.
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evolution.28
There was a further intermission in his studies after he married, while
he devoted himself to the practice of law. But in 1876, Holmes returned
to scholarly studies. With his characteristic method, he began a new
quarto-sized notebook in which he recorded his systematic reading; a
record that eventually was reduced to a simple list of books he read every
summer, but which at first included detailed pages of notes and citations
arranged by topic. During the next five years he continued his reading in
the evolution of philosophy, anthropology, and language. He read Her-
bert Spencer's new books, and the newer German historical studies of
law by Jhering. For the first time he read extensively on ethics, studying
Kant's ethics, and Wake's two-volume Evolution of Morality. He read
with great care, and took detailed notes on, Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law,
edited by Henry Adams and written by his students.29 These essays en-
riched Holmes's historical knowledge of the law, and encouraged him by
tracing a line of development from the institutions of "primitive" Ger-
manic tribes to the law of his own day. Prominent among the headings
in this new notebook once again were Jhering, Savigny, Fustel de Cou-
langes. The British utilitarians had all but vanished.
Holmes began a new series of articles in 1876, beginning with Primitive
Notions in Modern Law. 30 These articles were the basis for the Lowell
Lectures he gave in Boston, in the winter of 1880-1881, and which were
quickly adapted for his one great sustained theoretical work, The Com-
mon Law, published in 1881. As one might expect from his systematic
studies, in these essays and lectures Holmes described the law as the fos-
silized deposit of an organic, evolving society. Law was the record of the
evolving morality of society, its development traceable in the changing
contours of unconscious elements or structures of thought and language.
With completion of The Common Law in 1881, and his appointment
to the bench the following year, Holmes's systematic studies were ended
for a time. In the 1890s, he undertook a new course of reading in polit-
ical economy, which would confirm his belief that nations and classes
were engaged in a Malthusian struggle for survival.
28. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
29. See Oliver W. Holmes, Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law, 11 AM. L. REV. 327 (1877) (book
review). Holmes's notes are in his research notebook, known as the "Black Book," in the Harvard
Law School Library; several copies are with the Holmes Papers, supra note 1. For a reproduction of
one page of Holmes's notes on Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law, see the illustrations in MARK DEW.
HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 1870-1882, 148 (1963).
30. 10 AM. L. REV. 422 (1876).
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In those difficult years, his wife was chronically ill. She suffered a re-
currence of the grave rheumatic fever that had struck her shortly after
their marriage. Although she survived and recovered, her appearance for
a time was badly altered; her hair was shorn, and her behavior became
markedly eccentric. Both Holmes's parents and his two siblings died.
His own health was not good; and, in his mid-fifties, it appeared that his
career was ending in obscurity. The Common Law was forgotten by all
but a handful of scholars, and Holmes's path to promotion was blocked
by vigorous men only slightly older than himself. Holmes's letters dur-
ing this time are filled with his struggle to accept his circumstances and
his duty, and with his fear of an anonymous death.
In the midst of these difficulties, however, he added an important new
component to his thought. His ten years' experience on the bench, and
perhaps also his greater maturity, helped him to dredge up from the
depths of his difficulties an important addition to his thinking. Beyond
the common law, the result of the judges' decisions, was the duty of the
judge himself. Setting aside everything that was merely personal and
temporary, as well as setting aside the special interests of his own class,
the judge decided fairly who should be the victor in the peaceful, honora-
ble struggle for life under the rule of law.3 Although he did not say so,
this was a dramatic alteration in his thinking. Instead of being solely an
instrument of the victorious force, the judge in a civilized system of law
determined which of the contending forces would be the winner; the
judge consequently would help to determine the ultimate fitness of a soci-
ety as a whole to survive. This final complex addition to Holmes's juris-
prudence was eventually the core of some of his most famous and
important opinions on the freedom of speech.32
IV. HOLMES'S PERSONAL PHILOSOPHY RESTATED
A. Metaphysics
Holmes was a realist. Like modern realist philosophers, he assumed
the existence of an external world because its existence was the premise
of all thought and speech.
At the outset of our philosophy we take the step of supreme faith-we ad-
mit that we are not God. When I admit you, I announce that I am not
31. See Oliver W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).
32. See Sheldon M. Novick, The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, Sup. CT. REV.
(1992) (forthcoming).
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dreaming the universe but am existing in it as less than it.33
If one thinks at all, one must think about a real world that is to some
extent amenable to understanding. However, this belief in a reality in-
dependent of thought cannot be justified by reason, and so it is an act of
faith. "I have always said that every wise man was at bottom a mystic,
but one must get one's mysticism like one's miracles in the right place-
right at the beginning or end."'34
There was a strong flavor in this of the spirit of acceptance, the foun-
dation of New England's Calvinist spirit, that Holmes had acquired from
his mother. He always contrasted his own philosophy with that of ego-
ists, who shook their fists at the sky, and with that of William James,
who, Holmes said, turned down the lights to give miracles a chance.35
All that he knew was a material world, and so he was a materialist.
There was no need to assume that matter had limits, however. Matter
evidently could think; why imagine a mystery? Holmes evolved for him-
self or learned from his reading and talking something very similar to
Spinoza's monism: the one Substance contained both matter and form,
extension and thought. Holmes's address, The Use of Colleges, 36 is a
rough paraphrase of Spinoza, and his lifelong affinity for the realist phi-
losophers George Santayana and Morris R. Cohen shows the persistence
of these views. After reading George Santayana's preface to Spinoza's
Ethics, Holmes wrote that he felt as he had in his youth: "How much
nearer my view of the world is to Spinoza's than it is to, I don't know but
I may say, any other-leaving the machinery and the would-be mathe-
matically conceived reasoning out."'37
33. DEAN ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 63 (1965) (transcript of Holmes's conversation
with a young law clerk).
34. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lucy Clifford (Nov. 17, 1924), in Holmes Papers, supra
note 1, at B39 F25. Holmes went on, as he often did when in this vein, to contrast himself with
William James, who kept an open mind on spiritualism-miracles in the wrong place.
35. Id.
36. In HOLMES, supra note 2, at 49.
37. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 13, 1923), in 1 OLIVER W. HOLMES,
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JusTIcE HOLMES AND HAROLD J.
LASKI, 1916-1935, at 474 (Mark DeW. Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HOLMEs-LASKi LETTERS]; see
also HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS (Feb. 5, 1923), supra at 478. Frederick Pollock, Holmes's dear
friend, wrote a commentary that was important in the Spinoza revival of his generation; while
Holmes seems not to have read Pollock's work until the 1890s, Spinoza, like the German idealists,
was in the air.
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B. Epistemology
To Holmes, personal consciousness was just an intersection of rays
making white light where they crossed; phosphorescence on a wavelet in
the sea; a crossroads with an electric light."a
The human mind is perfectly mechanical even when it feels most spontane-
ous. I have probably told you before, how, when I had a wound in my heel,
I would see man after man, as he approached, irradiated with the same self-
congratulative smile, and then would follow a reference to Achilles.3 9
There was no difficulty about gaining knowledge of a kind. People had
awareness that made them fit to survive. This awareness told them the
world was a coherent, evolving world with orderly laws. From
Chauncey Wright, Holmes acquired the idea that the primitive aware-
ness of simple living things had evolved into the self-awareness of human
beings, and finally the awareness-of-awareness that was consciousness.'
The knowledge acquired by limited consciousness was no better than a
guess or bet, however.
Chauncey Wright[,] a nearly forgotten philosopher of real merit, taught me
when young that I must not say necessary about the universe, that we don't
know whether anything is necessary or not. So I describe myself as a
bettabilitarian. I believe that we can bet on the behavior of the universe in
its contact with us.
4 1
Time, space, logic, and cause were categories of human thought, and
one could not get outside them to see if they were absolute. "I surmise
that our modes of consciousness [are] not fundamental to the universe, if
there is one."'4 2 This was taken from Kant, from whom Holmes also
took the phrase Ding an Sich, the thing in itself.43 Holmes constantly
38. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lady Castletown (May 26, 1898), in Holmes Papers,
supra note 1, at B39 F12. Cf HARRY A. WOLFSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA: UNFOLDING
THE LATENT PROCESSES OF His REASONING 60-61 (1934).
39. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lady Castletown (Jan. 18, 1898), in Holmes Papers,
supra note 1, B39 F12.
40. See Wright, supra note 20.
41. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-POL-
LOCK LETTERS, supra note 16, at 252.
42. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Anna L. Gray (Aug. 26, 1905), in Holmes Papers, supra
note 1, at B31 F17.
43. Holmes seemed to identify his Great Swell with Kant's Ding an Sich: "[M]odes of con-
sciousness [are] not fundamental to the universe, if there is one. I think there are grounds for the
further surmise that Kant's ding an sich is not quite empty-that there is a somewhat, too closely
predicated even by that phrase, as to which we can't talk." Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Anna
L. Gray (Aug. 26, 1905), in Holmes Papers, supra note 1, at B31 F17.
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peered through the curtain, trying to get a glimpse of the Great Swell, of
things as they were in themselves. He read compulsively to discover
whether someone else had found the secret or heard a faint rustle. For
instance, Maeterlinck gave him the illusion of an "echo from behind phe-
nomena." He was almost persuaded that he did hear the clang of the
ultimate in Fabre's Souvenirs Entomologiques. After skimming those
volumes during the summer of 1912, when he wanted to express his faith
in the ultimate purpose of evolution, Holmes would speak of the grub
that blindly prepared a chamber for the winged thing it had never seen
but was to be.'
A strong hint of rebellion often surfaced in his writings, the struggle of
his ambition against the weight of his sense of dutiful acceptance; he ex-
pressed the same frustration with the inscrutable cosmos that he felt
when Lord Davey silenced debate .with, "That is not the law of
England."
You have in England a type unknown to us, of men who sufficiently ac-
count for themselves by transmitting a name. I sometimes wonder, as I
dare say I have said before now, whether the cosmos may not be like them,
too great a swell to have significance, leaving that to the finite, and finding it
enough to say "I'm ME," if it takes the trouble to say anything-which
after all is not so remote from prevailing theological notions translated into
other words.45
As he grew older, the Great Swell became the central metaphor in a
highly compressed, frequently repeated summary of his philosophy:
If I am in the universe, not it in me, I am in something that contains intel-
lect, significance, ideals. True, I surmise, I bet, that these all are expres-
sions of the finite, and that they are as unlikely to be cosmic categories as
they are to apply to a prince with a genealogy of 1000 years. He doesn't live
by his wits-He simply is.46
Holmes always pictured the Great Swell as exercising the arbitrary
power of a great king or the Old Testament's deity. The apparent regu-
larity of causal laws in the natural world was simply one of the Great
Swell's whims: the Cosmos was not bound by logic. Nor could logic
alone produce knowledge of the Cosmos. Holmes adopted Mill's attack
on Aristotelian logic, perhaps because he had a fundamental mistrust of
44. Law and the Court, in HOLMES, supra note 2, at 98.
45. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lady Castletown (Oct. 17, 1896), in Holmes Papers,
supra note 1, at B26 F9.
46. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 16, 1912), in Holmes Papers,
supra note 1, at B29 F2.
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deductive, syllogistic reasoning. Mill had argued that a syllogism did not
produce new knowledge, because its conclusion was already contained in
the premise; Holmes made this one of the pillars of his thought. Espe-
cially in his early writings,4 7 he expressed the greatest contempt for
purely deductive reasoning-the conclusion was always concealed in the
premises. As he famously proclaimed, a judge's decision depended on an
unconscious or inarticulate premise, "a judgment or intuition more sub-
tle than any articulate major premise."48 The Common Law is one long
attack on purely deductive, logical systems of arguments like those of the
utilitarians and modem Hegelians, and on the humbler rationalizations
of ordinary judges' opinions.
The thing to bet on was an induction, a conclusion from known partic-
ulars. Philosophy, which meant scientific thought, was just the accumu-
lation of particulars, and the gradual development of more and more
general statements about them. Holmes thought this accumulation of
knowledge was progressive, so that the primitive thoughts of the Greeks
had been thoroughly displaced by modem science,49 but knowledge was
never better than a probability. In Holmes's favorite paradox, the Great
Swell, the arbitrary cosmos, was a "jumping spontaneity taking an irra-
tional pleasure in a momentary rational sequence."'
Rational sequence was important. Deductive logic was not a method
for discovering new truths, but it was a necessary characteristic of truth
once obtained. All experience showed, and all talk and argument about
the world in general assumed, that its parts were related in an orderly
causal way that could be summarized in scientific laws. Logic, therefore,
was a necessary but not a sufficient condition of truth. The cosmos was
not limited by the rules of logic; it had thought, but perhaps more than
thought, in it. Contradictory positions, logically derived from true prem-
ises, might both be true. The antinomies of thought were familiar to
Holmes, just as they were to his friends William James51 and Louis Bran-
47. After 20 years as a judge, however, Holmes appears to have conceded that deductive rea-
soning could be creative in a modest way, by extending existing principles to new sets of facts and so
developing new law. See Stack v. New York, N.H. & Hartford R.R., 58 N.E. 686, 687 (Mass. 1900)
("We do not forget the continuous process of developing the law that goes on through the courts, in
the form of deduction.").
48. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
49. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Oct. 1, 1901), in Holmes Papers, supra
note 1, at B43 F12.
50 See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Mar. 29, 1908), in Holmes
Papers, supra note 1, at B43 F12.
51. See I RALPH B. PERRY, THE THOUGHT AND CHARACTER OF WILLIAM JAMES 719 (1935).
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deis.5 2 Perhaps Holmes had encountered them originally in Kant-his
favorite example was the infinity of consciousness, trapped within the
finite limits of a skull-or indirectly though Coleridge, who had made
Kant's argument familiar to the doctor's generation, and a truism to
Holmes's.1 3 Antinomies, vividly pictured, became one of Holmes's con-
versational gambits:
I have often done my part to amuse a bored god by trying to imagine how
many universes might be existing in the same space at the same time with-
out conflicting. Where we are sitting now a tyrannosaurus may be locked
in a death struggle with some unnamed creature of another sphere from
ours.
54
Truths in such a world were both personal and objective. One could
know truths only from within the system of one's own personal limita-
tions, without external confirmation. This did not make them less true;
they were only not absolute. One lived one's life-did one's job, in
Holmes's frequent image-"without waiting for an angel to assure us
that it is the jobbest job in jobdom."' s Philosophy was a solitary and
dangerous business, like life itself.
Holmes's philosophy therefore rested on a demonstration of the inade-
quacy of reason; indeed, one of his frequently repeated paradoxes was
that truth was just the system of his limitations. In his famous "can't
helps," he believed what he could not help believing, and his tastes and
morals were what he could not help having. "All I mean by truth is the
path I have to travel."5 6
This was not relativism; still less was it pragmatism. To Holmes, per-
sonal truths were true enough; a fact was part of the real, external world,
and if one was wrong about a fact, it might kill him. In the process of
surviving one learned truths. Such truths were relative only in the sense
that they were partial, and in a cosmos that insisted upon, but was not
bound by, logic, there might be other true but contradictory systems of
52. See ACHESON, supra note 33, at 83.
53. "Plato... leads you to see that propositions involving ... contradictory conceptions are
nevertheless true; and which, therefore, must belong to a higher logic-that of ideas. They are
contradictory only in the Aristotelian logic .... " Samuel T. Coleridge, Table Talk, quoted it
RICHARD ELLMANN, OSCAR WILDE 237 (1988).
54. ACHESON, supra note 33, at 63 (transcript of Holmes's conversation with a young law
clerk).
55. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Morris R. Cohen (May 27, 1917), in HOLMES-COHEN
LETrERS, supra note 4, at 316.
56. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Oct. 1, 1901), in Holmes Papers, supra
note 1, at B43 F12.
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thought. "Everything seems an illusion relative to something else-as
green relatively to vibrations-" and so on, until one came to the Great
Swell, the unknowable cosmos; yet, "The cell has its life as well as the
larger organism in whose unity it has a part-and our subrealities are no
doubt part of all the reality there is." 5 7
Other people, with their own presumably different sets of personal lim-
itations, allowed one to calibrate one's beliefs. As a judge, Holmes rarely
dissented alone, because he thought it important to verify one's ideas by
comparing them with other's perceptions of the common, external
reality.
If I think that I am sitting at a table I find that the other persons present
agree with me; so if I say that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to
two right angles. If I am in a minority of one they send for a doctor or lock
me up; and I am so far able to transcend the to me convincing testimony of
my senses or my reason as to recognize that if I am alone probably some-
thing is wrong with my works.5"
This is not the pragmatists' social test of truth by agreement. Holmes,
the solitary observer, was simply checking or triangulating his observa-
tions by reference to other points of view in whose existence he could not
help believing.
Kant is again visible here, as the common point of origin of both
Holmes's realism and William James's pragmatism. To Holmes, com-
plex ideas, like the sum of the angles of a triangle, were built into the
structure of one's thought because evolution had taught the organism to
make ideas that corresponded to qualities of the external world.59 Yet
complex ideas, like finite and infinite, although true, as we have seen
could be mutually contradictory. Differences among sane observers
therefore were fundamentally matters of taste or character. "[T]wenty
men of genius looking out the same window will paint twenty canvases,
each unlike all the others, and every one great."'  People of similar
background had similar views. Generally, moral, aesthetic, and practical
values were different aspects of national character at a particular time.
Each "race" or nation engaged with the ultimate in its own way, and
57. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Oct. 14, 1911), in Holmes Papers, supra
note 1, at B43 F13.
58. Oliver W. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40, 40 (1918).
59. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897).
60. The Class of '61, in HOLMES, supra note 2, at 95, 96.
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equally expressed its values in art or in law.61
The contradictions among perspectives were real and could not be re-
solved by discourse; one was obliged to choose, or, where choice was not
possible, to accept that one was helpless to transcend one's limitations.
[P]roperty, friendship, and truth have a common root in time. One cannot
be wrenched from the rocky crevices into which one has grown for many
years without feeling that one is attacked in one's life .... But while one's
experience thus makes certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition
of how they came to be so leaves one able to see that others, poor souls, may
be equally dogmatic about something else.62
Despite the need to gain objectivity by comparing one's ideas to
others', philosophy was a solitary activity. In the end, short of killing the
other fellow, there was no way to settle fundamental disagreements. So
the cosmos sorted out the greater truths from the lesser, in the only way
that had any objective meaning-by extinguishing the lesser.
I think that values like truth are largely personal. There is enough commu-
nity for us to talk[ but] not enough for anyone to command .... Whether
you take sugar in your coffee or not you are equally up against an ultimate
dogma, which as arbitrary you have no call to impose, unless indeed you
care enough about it to kill the other man, which I admit is the logical
outcome-you can't refute him.63
The chief claim of civilization was that it had substituted, however
partially, an orderly process of peaceful discourse for this violent evolu-
tion. Politics and law, like the natural sciences, provided laboratories in
which to test the correspondence of ideas to reality. But the laboratory
was only a surrogate for reality; the test of civilization would ultimately
be its success in subordinating itself to the Great Swell, the brutal and
uncaring Cosmos: "I do not believe that a shudder would go through the
sky if our whole ant heap were kerosened." 6
61. This is the attitude of ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY
IN WESTERN LITERATURE (1953); and also, I think, of Holmes's friend Henry James.
62. Holmes, supra note 58, at 40-41.
63. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Aug. 20, 1909), in Holmes Papers, supra
note 1, at B43 F12.
64. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Morris R. Cohen (May 27, 1917), in HOLMES-COHEN
LETTERS, supra note 3, at 316. But this was too definite an assertion about the cosmos, so Holmes
immediately added: "But then it might-in short my only belief is that I know nothing about it."
Id.
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C. Ethics
Holmes insisted there was no such thing as ethics.
I said to a lady at dinner the other night that morals were a contrivance of
man to take himself seriously, which means that the philosophers instead of
making them merely one of the conveniences of living to be talked about no
more than money, make them an end in themselves, an absolute matter,
and so an excuse for their pretention to be on the ground floor and personal
friends of God.65
In the end, Holmes reconciled science and morals by saying that there
were no ethics, only manners.66 Not that he took manners lightly; he
always said that a gentleman was someone who would die for a point of
honor. It was most gentlemanly, as in the Tennyson poem, to die for a
senseless point of honor; this was the purest exhibition of an instinct im-
planted by nature for its own evolutionary purposes. Holmes felt that he
could no more help having a sense of duty, than he could help believing
in an external, material world. His address Memorial Day 67 was the first
in the slim volume of speeches in which he encapsulated his philosophy.
It was a paean to the courage and idealism of young soldiers on both
sides of the war, who had given their lives to their respective and mutu-
ally contradictory causes, both of which logically could not be worthy of
sacrifice, but which, like the north and south poles of a magnet, seemed
to be part of some larger whole.
On 1913, on the eve of World War I, he closed the book with Law and
the Court, 68 a declaration of faith in the unknown future of evolution, to
which duty required such sacrifices.
V. POLITICAL ECONOMY
Holmes was an evolutionist, what is now loosely called a Social Dar-
winist, but of a peculiar sort, explicable in a man who grew up in a world
where evolution and chivalry were both taken for granted.
65. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Feb. 7, 1909), in Holmes Papers, supra
note 1, at B43 F12.
66. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Holmes'Honorable Style, 11 CHRISTIAN L. Soc'y Q. 26 (Fall 1990)
(book review). Holmes did not believe in the reality of ethics, in the Kantian or Christian sense of
absolute standards of behavior. This, I think, is the central objection in some of the criticism of
Holmes as a person and as a thinker. See, most recently, Patrick J. Kelley, The Life of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 429, 482-83 (1990) (reviewing SHELDON M. NOVICK, HON-
ORABLE JUSTICE (1989)).
67. In HOLMES, supra note 2, at 1.
68. Id. at 98.
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
722 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
A. Evolutionism
Holmes, who called himself an evolutionist,6 9 believed that his ideas
were derived from Darwin, but Holmes had not read Darwin's books and
his ideas actually reflected an older version of evolution, most strongly
influenced by Hegel.Y
Without making too much of Hegel the reader may wish to use his
name simply as a convenient summary of German Idealism as it arrived
in Boston in Holmes's youth. Even then, the name may be no more than
a short-hand term for the mentality of his time. Holmes lived in a post-
Cartesian, post-Kantian world, but it may be that Frederick the Great
and Napoleon had as much to do as Descartes, Kant, or Hegel, with the
romantic picture of history as a clash of cultures, led by heroes, that
Holmes absorbed.
It is not surprising, in any case, that Holmes believed in a particular
sort of evolution, an evolution that proceeded through the contest of na-
tions or races, each representing a distinct principle or mode of life. This
was a perfectly conventional pre-Darwinian view, embedded in the his-
tory and anthropology of the day.71 Once Darwin's great work was pub-
lished the notion of natural selection was assimilated very easily to it.
Holmes and many of his contemporaries believed that natural selection
operated on whole races or societies, determining which should survive,72
rather than, as we should say now, affecting relative frequencies of genes.
Holmes also followed the conventional wisdom of his day (and ours) in
believing that evolution had a direction, from the simple to the complex.
69. See, eg., Justice Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, Address of the Dedication of the
new hall at Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 468 (1897).
70. When Holmes finally read Hegel in the 1890s, with much muttering and complaint, he
obliquely acknowledged the indirect influence:
The beast has insights but these are wrapped up in such a humbugging method and with so
much that is unintelligible or unreal or both that you have to work your way. Such good
as Hegel did I am inclined to think was mainly at second hand through his influence on
people who wrote and talked outside his system and even then he has been a blight on
juridical thoughts in Germany.
Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lady Castletown (Oct. 7, 1896), in Holmes Papers, supra note 1,
at B26 F9. See also Michael H. Hoftheimer, Holmes, L Q. C. Lamar, and Natural Law, 58 Miss.
L.J. 71 (1988), citing Roscoe Pound, The Revival of Natural Law, 17 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 287,
333 (1942).
71. For an account of evolutionist theories growing out of history and anthropology before
Darwin, see generally, J.W. BURROW, EVOLUTION AND SOCIETY: A STUDY IN VICTORIAN SOCIAL
THEORY (1966).
72. See, eg., A.R. WALLACE, The Origin of the Human Race, JOURNAL OF THE ANTHROPO-
LOGICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON, 11 (1864), quoted in BURROW, supra note 71, at 114-15 n.2 (1966).
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His own society he thought more highly evolved, more advanced in some
fundamental way, than any that had come before. Organisms became
larger and more highly specialized, and he believed that social institu-
tions also became larger and more specialized over time. The "increasing
organization of the world," the creation of monopolies and empires, with
the concomitant organization of society into cadres of specialists, seemed
to him patent and inevitable. But he did not welcome the future that this
foretold. "Before the war it seemed to me that the trades unions and the
trusts pointed to a more despotic regime. So long as efficiency is an ideal
their tendency would seem to be enhanced by the war. I am not particu-
larly in love with it."73
He was particularly dismayed at the increasing specialization this
higher degree of organization entailed-not the specialization of knowl-
edge, which he thought the route to truth, but the quasi-physiological
specialization of social roles. The university professor was a favorite ex-
ample: "[T]hose who have spared themselves this supreme trial [of bat-
tle], and have fostered a faculty at the expense of their total life."7 4
But it would not do to shake one's fist at the sky, so Holmes cheerfully
accepted the inevitability of higher degrees of organization and speciali-
zation. Once again, this is a view of Herbert Spencer, but it was so much
in the air that it would be wrong to attribute it to any particular influ-
ence; to a large degree Holmes's observations were correct, although we
would not now attribute them to "evolution" in any modern sense of the
word.
One principal sign and mechanism of increasing complexity was the
development of self-awareness, to which Holmes thought he had contrib-
uted importantly. Modern thinkers had learned to see themselves seeing,
and modern philosophy was like a room with mirrors at both ends.
Legal philosophy, in particular, through Holmes, had become self-aware.
He announced, "The time has gone by when law is only an unconscious
embodiment of the common will. It has become a conscious reaction
upon itself of organized society knowingly seeking to determine its own
destinies."75
73. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (July 28, 1916), in I HOLMEs-LASKI LET-
TERS, supra note 37, at 8.
74. George Otis Shattuck in HOLMES, supra note 2, at 70, 73.
75. Oliver W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1894).
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B. Malthusian Economics
It was universally assumed among Holmes's peers-wrongly, one
should now say-that the mechanism of natural selection was violent
competition among races for limited means of subsistence. The image
was fundamentally Hegel's account of the battle of Salamis, a great clash
of rival civilizations embodying competing principles. For Holmes, the
image was the clash of North and South in the American Civil War. The
motive for this rivalry was supposed to have been explained by Malthus,
to whose books and ideas Holmes referred with increasing frequency as
he grew older. It was an article of faith to Holmes, embedded in all the
political economy of his day, that the growth of population would always
exceed the increase in available resources.76 The means of subsistence
therefore would always be inadequate and the loser in the struggle for life
would perish.
In considering his views, one should recall Holmes's three years in
combat, as well as the brutal quality of life for the majority of people in
Holmes's day. In Massachusetts, as late as 1890, the average life expec-
tancy at birth of a male was only forty-two years.77 Women died in
childbirth in what now seems incomprehensible numbers-perhaps as
many as one percent of all women of childbearing age died in childbirth
each year.78
Infant mortality, which averaged nearly one in five, was even worse in
working class families. Every summer, epidemics of typhoid and diar-
rhea swept through the cities, causing tremendous mortality among chil-
dren in a few weeks of August and September.79 Not surprisingly,
Holmes believed that in peacetime, as in the war, the weak did perish,
and that all the resources available to society were not adequate to pro-
duce any other result. People were poor because there was not enough
76. Leslie Stephen claimed that the whole school of classical economics was formed on
Malthus, although economists liked to give lip service to Adam Smith. 2 LESLIE STEPHEN, THE
ENGLISH UTILITARIANS 239 (1900).
77. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES LIFE TABLES, 1890, 1901, 1910, & 1901-1910,
at 132 (1921).
78. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MORTALITY STATISTICS 1900-1904, at clxxxiv (1906) (mortality
of women of child-bearing age is estimated from the proportion of all women dying).
79. Id. at xxii to xxxv. Doctor Holmes's household was more aware of these events than most.
"The evenings grow cooler in August, but there is mischief abroad in the air. Heaven fills up fast
with young angels in this month and in September." The Seasons, in OLIVER W. HOLMES [SR.],
PAGES FROM AN OLD VOLUME OF LIFE: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 1857-1881, at 156 (Cambridge,
Riverside Press 1891).
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wealth in total to maintain a decent average. The rich had no fund of
luxuries large enough to alter the prevailing standard. In a speech at
Williams College as late as 1912, Holmes said, "I was informed that 85
percent of the total product here and in England was consumed by peo-
ple with not over $1000 (E200) a year-the whole expenses of govern-
ment and the moderate luxuries of the many coming out of the remaining
15 percent."180
The problem was particularly acute because the world was filling up,
with the last unsettled regions becoming populated. "[T]here is so much
forest, coal, etc[.] so much even atmosphere-and no more. I wonder if
it might not be possible that those who are withdrawing nitrogen from
the latter might in time be found to be doing a deadly thing."'"
Holmes viewed life as a zero-sum game, as we say now. The free mar-
ket was not so much desirable as inevitable; it was pointless and self-
defeating to try to reverse the verdict of free competition. Just as fights
always ended with a victor, competition ended with a monopoly.
Although political regulation of the power of monopolies was justified
and even necessary, prices reflected the intensity of the public's compet-
ing desires for different forms of consumption-what we would now call
opportunity costs-rather than competition among producers.8 2 Simi-
larly, wages were determined by competition between groups of workers;
any advantages achieved by trade unions were secured at the expense of
unorganized workers.8 3 There was no significant surplus accumulated by
capital and withheld from the working class.84 Because national ac-
counts had not yet been invented when Holmes began to preach his doc-
trine, he resorted to images, principally the image of a "stream of
products," by which he meant roughly what is now called the gross na-
tional product. Quite certain that the stream of products was consumed
by the large mass of people, he believed that proportionately very little
was diverted to the pleasures of the wealthy.
Therefore, proposals to undo the results of competition and redistrib-
80. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Canon Patrick Sheehan (July 5, 1912), in HOLMES-
SHEEHAN LETrERS, supra note 14, at 45. The text of the talk has not survived.
81. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Feb. 28, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LET-
TERS, supra note 37, at 187-88.
82. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 412 (1911) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
83. See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
84. Oliver W. Holmes, Are Great Fortunes Great Dangers? COSMOPOLITAN, Feb. 1906, re-
printed as Economic Elements, in OLIVER W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 279 (1920).
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ute wealth seemed to Holmes merely contemptible demagoguery. With
great relish he told his young socialist friend Harold Laski: "When I read
Malthus I thought he had ripped the guts out of some humbugs-but
they are as alive as ever today. Humbugs have no guts-and live all the
better without them." 5 He told Frankfurter that he wished God would
write in letters of fire on the sky:
The Crowd has all there is
The Crowd pays for everything. 6
Life was a struggle over inadequate means; however, the struggle was
not so much among individuals as it was between races. "I incline to
believe.., that before our clamorers for eight hours (with which clamor
I rather sympathize) know it, the Chinese with their endless gluttony for
work, their honesty and their imperturbable patience will cut the white
races out in the markets of the world.""7
C. Race and Gender; Eugenics
Both "race" and the relations between the sexes were entwined with
political economy in Holmes's ideas.
As to race, we have to make an imaginative effort to recover the con-
text of the Victorian age. In Holmes's formative years, the mechanism of
genetics, revealed in Brother Mendel's pea plants, had not yet been redis-
covered. Nearly all scientists, including Darwin, believed that acquired
85. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Dec. 26, 1917), in HOLMES-LASKI LET-
TERs, supra note 37, at 122.
86. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Aug. 10, 1916), in Holmes Papers,
supra note 1, at B29 F4. Perhaps even letters of fire would not have been enough. In Frankfurter's
30 page chapter on Property and Society, in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT (2d
ed. 1961), he hinted heavily that Holmes was sympathetic to movements to redistribute the wealth of
society. As to Holmes's stream-of-products argument, Frankfurter said only, obscurely, that
Holmes subscribed to the "wage fund" theory. Frankfurter did not explain this reference to John
Stewart Mill's contemptuous name for a doctrine supposedly held by classical economics, that total
wages were limited to a fixed share of the national product, but never clearly stated except by Mill
himself when he abandoned it. Max Lerner, in his otherwise acute THE MIND AND FAITH OF
JUSTICE HOLMES (1943), also muddled Holmes's straightforward image of the gross national prod-
uct by calling it a "wage fund" theory. Id. at 117. Samuel J. Konefsky, in his influential THE
LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS (1956), devoted a full five pages to sneering at Holmes's sup-
posed belief in the wage fund theory. Konefsky thought it a sufficient rebuttal to say, "Organized
labor has always regarded this doctrine as both fallacious and reactionary." Id. at 23. These writers
apparently used "wage fund" as a sneering shorthand for classical economics, which they assumed
had been exploded.
87. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Canon Patrick Sheehan (Sept. 17, 1907), in HOLMES-
SHEEHAN LETTERS, supra note 14, at 18-19.
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characteristics were inherited in some way. Reinforcing this view were
the huge disparities in nutrition and sunlight received by the different
economic classes, which resulted in well-to-do and poor that were physi-
cally quite different. The workman, stunted with rickets, looked as if he
were of a different race from his taller, healthier employer. The descrip-
tions of "racial" differences among the classes, so common in Henry
James and other novelists of the time, did not rest on prejudice, but were
realistic accounts. The candor with which racial stereotypes were ap-
plied is shocking now; but, in Holmes's generation study and discussion
of "races" was not only acceptable, it was considered progressive and
scientific. The premise of progressive thinking was that better hygiene
and education would improve the racial stock of inferior classes.
The struggle for survival was understood as a test of racial fitness;
here, Holmes's ideas developed into brutal notions of racial hygiene. He
accepted the validity of the "scientific anthropology" of his day, which
promised to identify inheritable criminal traits through measurements of
skull dimensions and the like. Referring to Cesare Lombroso's scientific
anthropology,8" which purported to show that criminals were distinctive
physiological types, a form of degeneration or atavism, Holmes said:
"The Italians have begun work upon the notion that the foundations of
the law ought to be scientific, and, if our civilization does not collapse, I
feel pretty sure that the regiment or division that follows us will carry
that flag." 89 Holmes concluded with relentless logic that a revival of ex-
tensive capital punishment for crime might be needed.
If the typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or to murder by as
deep seated an organic necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake bite, it
is idle to talk of deterring him by the classical method of imprisonment. He
must be got rid of, he cannot be improved, or frightened out of his struc-
tural reaction.'
Holmes did not view capital punishment as necessarily inhumane. The
unfit were bound to perish by one means or another. "I always say that
88. For a brief summary of the Italian school of scientific anthropology in the 1890s, see RUTH
HARRIS, MURDERS AND MADNESS: MEDICINE, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN THE FIN DE SI.CLE 80-85
(1989). For a more extensive discussion of Lombroso's thought and its wide impact on views of
social evolution, see DANIEL PICK, FACES OF DEGENERATION: A EUROPEAN DISORDER, C. 1848-
1918, at 109-52 (1989).
89. Learning and Science, in HOLMES, supra note 2, at 67, 68.
90. Holmes, supra note 69, at 470. Holmes went on to note the contrary view of the French
school, that the physical causes of crime were environmental. However, he concluded that in either
case the criminal was organically malformed, and hence could not be deterred or reformed.
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society is founded on the death of men-if you don't kill the weakest one
way you kill them another."91 Holmes never put any external limits on
the power of a nation to seek its own survival, and he made no real dis-
tinction between law enforcement and war. "[C]lasses as well as nations
that mean to be in the saddle have got to be ready to kill to keep their
seat."'9 2 It followed that even violent eugenic measures were within ordi-
nary police powers.93
In addition to capital punishment, Holmes seems to have imagined,
under a more advanced science, infanticide of those otherwise doomed to
lingering misery and death: "I can imagine a future in which science
shall have passed from the combative to the dogmatic stage, and shall
have gained such catholic acceptance that it shall take control of life, and
condemn at once with instant execution what is now left for nature to
destroy." 94
Holmes seemed to feel that this was the only real alternative to war,
and that it was preferable. "I should be glad, to speak Hibernianly, if it
could be arranged that the death should precede life by provisions for a
selected race, but we shall not live to see that." 95
In retrospect, clearly, the "scientific" anthropology and evolutionism
upon which Holmes rested his opinions were wrong; indeed, at this dis-
tance they seem dangerously foolish. Holmes was not to know this, but
it is odd that this man, who prided himself on his skepticism of utopias
and nostrums, and on his suspicion of purely logical arguments, accepted
second-hand accounts of evolutionary science with so little question.
While Holmes was not obsessed with the fears of racial degeneration
which were common in his day, the ease with which he talked of capital
punishment and infanticide is disturbing and seems to call for a psycho-
logical explanation.
One passage is particularly striking. In a love letter to Clare
91. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 26, 1922), in 2 HOLMES-PoL-
LOCK LETTERS, supra note 16, at 90.
92. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Oct. 12, 1914), in OLIVER W. HOLMES,
THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EIN-
STEIN 1903-1935, at 101 (James B. Peabody ed., 1964) [hereinafter HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS],
93. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (compulsory sterilization for "mental defectives"
does not violate constitutional due process, as long as procedural fairness is preserved).
94. The Soldier's Faith, in HOLMES, supra note 2, at 56, 58.
95. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 1, 1920), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETTERS, supra note 16, at 36. To "speak Hibernianly" is a reference to the derogatory term, "Irish
Bull," for a self-contradictory expression.
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Castletown, Holmes spoke of reading a book by the socialist writer Ed-
ward Bellamy. As always, the mention of socialism set him off:
The socialists so far as I know shut their eyes to matters of population or
tell you in an airy way that Henry George has refuted Malthus and Darwin.
I could discourse on this theme but won't. But until you substitute artificial
selection for natural [selection] by putting to death the inadequate, or get
the whole world to limit procreation to the visible means of support, I do
not believe you will see socialism successful. Existing society is founded on
the death of men. While I write in this abstract way I am thinking of you
until you seem almost present-and I can hardly go on.9 6
Similarly brutal passages within very affectionate letters were not unu-
sual for Holmes. While they began in the 1890s they continued through
much of his life. Twenty years after this letter to Lady Castletown,
Holmes wrote in almost identical terms of his contempt for "all socialism
not prepared to begin with life rather than with property and to kill eve-
ryone below the standard." '97
There is an odd disconnectedness, an unexplained gap, between the
brutal talk of killing and the warm expressions of affection that followed
immediately thereafter. Without trying to delve too deeply into an un-
conscious mind that long ago escaped questioning, a couple of thoughts
suggest themselves.
First, in the Civil War, Holmes's parents urged him to enlist and reen-
list in the army at a time when he, and perhaps they as well, feared that
this meant his death. His duty as an officer was principally to whip his
men into standing up to being shot. Consequently, he emerged from the
war persuaded that morality, honor, and duty meant willingness to die in
service to high principles. Thereafter, it seemed understandable, even
right, to him that people would be asked to die for society's inscrutable
aims, and he became annoyed when they objected. His fantasies of scien-
tific infanticide also hint at an unconscious belief that his parents sent
him to war to die.98
Another strand to his feeling, perhaps related to the first, was coiled at
96. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lady Castletown (Aug. 19, 1897), in Holmes Papers,
supra note 1, at B39 F2.
97. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Aug. 6, 1917), in HOLMES-EINSTEIN
LETTERS, supra note 92, at 145. In this, as in other ways, the letters that Homes wrote to young
men when he was past 70 were very much like his middle-aged letters to young women.
98. Holmes's Civil War experience may be the source of Michael Hoffheimer's intuition that
Holmes's mother was absent. See Michael Hoffheimer, Justice Holmes: The Search for Control, Sup.
CT. HIsT. Soc'y Y.B. 58 (1989).
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its core. Holmes viewed all human relations as forms of power and com-
bat. This was particularly marked in his feelings toward women.
One of Holmes's chestnuts was that the moral quality of society was
an "empirical mixture" of the masculine and feminine qualities. "Empir-
ical mixture" was an image borrowed from his father's description of the
atmosphere, and Holmes used it to describe morality, "which is really a
compromise between two irreconcilable sexes." Man's contribution to
the mixture was, "the ideal drawn from conflict-doing a stump, as the
boys say." 99 The female contribution was not so clearly spelled out, but
one gathers from his letters that if Holmes had to define the female ideal
in equally simple and essential terms that he would have defined it as the
mother, infinitely accepting and reassuring.
The complete separation of the sexes into distinct roles, and the identi-
fication of the male role with combat and competition, led to a bleak
picture of life. Holmes opposed the vote for women, precisely because
government was founded on force, and therefore politics was ultimately a
business of the bludgeon and the bayonet to which women were not
suited. The relation of men and women was itself a form of government
founded ultimately on force. Most likely Holmes would have agreed
with the modem, feminist, assessment:
We are not accustomed to associate patriarchy with force. So perfect is its
system of socialization, so complete the general assent to its values, so long
and universally has it prevailed in human society, that it scarcely seems to
require violent implementation .... And yet ... control in patriarchal
society would be imperfect, even inoperable, unless it had the rule of force
to rely upon, both in emergencies and as an ever-present instrument of
intimidation. to
In personal relations, as in law, the foundation of civility and chivalry,
was self-restraint. To Ellen Curtis he wrote:
In the matrimonial market virtue seems to be in the hands of the bears just
now. It will come up again as most men like a naivet6 which they rarely
emulate. The talk of equality in such matters singularly fails to move
my enthusiasm-I can't see any rights about it-but powers -and
generosities. 101
99. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lady Castletown (Apr. 10, 1897), in Holmes Papers,
supra note 1, at B39 Fl.
100. Susan Koppelman, Letter to Dear Friends, AM. VOICE 50, 58 (Winter 1990) (quoting Jane
Caputik who was quoting Kate Millet).
101. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Ellen Curtis (May 15, 1901), in Holmes Papers, supra
note 1.
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In this little fragment, sexual relationships were described in the same
terms Holmes used when speaking of law and government, and ending
with the same result, that "rights" were dependent on self-restraint by
the dominant power.
These were not unusual sentiments in a man of Holmes's time and
place. Indeed, Holmes was the model for Basil Ransome, the type of
conventional, chivalrous masculinity portrayed in his friend Henry
James's The Bostonians. Holmes's relations with the opposite sex do not
seem to have been unconventional in any way. He preferred the com-
pany of women to that of men, and his letters to women were more open
and more interesting than those addressed to men. His letters to Alice
Stopford Green, 02 for instance, are far more revealing of his thought and
feelings than his letters to, say, Felix Frankfurter.10
3
He also had conventional prejudices and blindness. He did not like
women's writing to be sexually suggestive: "Perhaps because we know,
though the older literary tradition is the other way, that they take less
interest in the business than we do.' '"" 4 Noting the senseless brutality of
the rule that a rape victim must report the crime promptly, he neverthe-
less described it as a meaningless survival of the ancient hue-and-cry,
without seeming to consider that it might reflect something worse.' 5
Holmes and his wife had a vigorous if somewhat routinized sexual life, as
surviving letters between them clearly indicate. Like Basil Ransome's
marriage to Verena Tarrant at the conclusion of The Bostonians, it was
a troubled, somewhat unequal relationship, that was profoundly
conventional.
Holmes had a good deal of sexual energy, and the intensity and speed
with which he worked (as a Massachusetts judge he tried to write opin-
ions in the evening after oral arguments had been heard) was at least
partly intended to keep his weekends and summers free for trips to New
York and London, and the courtly flirtations that energized his work.
Although one can never know what happened behind closed doors, it
appears likely that on some occasions when his wife, Fanny, was too ill to
perform her conjugal duties (I think that is how both of them thought of
102. Holmes Papers, supra note 1.
103. Holmes Papers, supra note 1.
104. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (June 20, 1928), in 2 HOLMES-POL-
LOCK LETTERS, supra note 16, at 223.
105. Oliver W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 453 (1899).
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it) he had affairs. Holmes's love letters to Lady Castletown, t0 6 for in-
stance, do not reveal the secrets of the bedroom, but they leave no doubt
about the fundamental nature of their relationship.
There is no reason to think Holmes was promiscuous or exploitive in
his relationships with women. He consciously made use of his abundant
sexual energy by sublimating it in his work-the traditions of chivalry,
especially of courtly love, were particularly congenial to the Victorians
on this score.107 Some of the power of his writing is due to his ability
consciously to harness these energies.
In short, his relations with women were consistently conventional.
Perhaps there is no need to look for reasons in his own history for his
apparent feeling that the relations between the sexes, like all other human
relationships, were ultimately a struggle for survival. Holmes's world
was a rather bleak one; and after the Civil War, he was not a reformer.
He was aware of the injustices of class and gender, if not acutely sensitive
to them, but he accepted the existing order and did not blame anyone for
it. He believed that the only hope for ameliorating the fundamental
source of injustice, the lack of adequate means, was to limit the size of
the population.
D. The Priority of Honor
We now return to the difficult question of Holmes's views on eugenics.
Holmes's relationships with women inevitably affected, and to some de-
gree explained, his brutal approval of "artificial selection;" but, a few
words more are needed before leaving this topic. If in his views of class
and gender he was simply a man of his time, his views on eugenics were a
different matter. One cannot read Holmes's phrase, "putting to death
the inadequate," uttered so casually, without profound disquiet. This
goes well beyond the conventional views on eugenics of his day. And it is
worse than wrong, it is evil.
Therefore, I must explain why, in the end, I find Holmes better than
his ideas. To do this I must lapse into biography.
Although the evidence is limited, it appears that Holmes faced the im-
plications of his evolutionism in the early 1890s. In that decade, as we
106. Holmes Papers, supra note 1.
107. For instance, the sustained imagery of his toast to "our mistress, the Law." See also The
Law, in HOLMES, supra note 2, at 16. See generally Courtly Love, in NovicK, supra note 6, at 178;
Hofiheimer, supra note 98, at 105-09. Hoftheimer's psychoanalytic study is marred by his peculiar
assumption that Holmes's references to chivalry were jokes.
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have seen, his mother, brother, sister, and father died, leaving only a
nephew and himself as the survivors of his name. At the same time, his
wife sank back into the chronic illness that Holmes believed had left
them childless.
Holmes was troubled at this time by the temptation to leave his child-
less marriage, and by the thought that it was his duty to do so, to ensure
the survival of his line. There was a common feeling in his day that such
duties were owed to the nation. The census of 1890 showed the relative
decline of New Englanders of British origin, and Holmes was certainly
aware of the much heated talk of "race suicide" that followed. For in-
stance, Theodore Roosevelt made frequent references in his speeches and
letters to "race criminals," who refused to perform their duty to procre-
ate: "The man.., who has a heart so cold as to know no passion and a
brain so shallow and selfish as to dislike having children, is in effect a
criminal against the race and should be an object of contemptuous abhor-
rence by all healthy people."10 8
Holmes's letters show that he considered whether it was his duty to
have children. However, in the end he decided to stand by his wife.
While this was both a duty to her, and his personal inclination, the evi-
dence on the subject is limited. Holmes, while open about his own feel-
ings with friends, was very protective of his wife's privacy. Both his
father's and his own papers relating to her illness were destroyed, and
friends of the family seem to have cooperated. In one letter that has
survived Holmes discussed their childlessness:
Once at dinner in England old Sir Fitzroy Kelly on hearing that we had no
children said, "Le bon temps viendra." But I am so far abnormal that I am
glad I have none. It might be said that to have them is part of the manifest
destiny of man, as of other creatures, and that he should accept it as he
accepts his destiny to strive-but the latter he can't help-and part of his
destiny is to choose. I might say some sad things but I won't. Whatever I
may think of life, the last years of mine have been happy and are so now.
Of course, if I should break down before I die it would be awkward as there
is no one to look after me as a child would-but I daresay my nephew and
my friends would cook up something.1t 9
Holmes seemed to be saying that he chose between duties, and that, in
retrospect, from the age of seventy-seven, he was not sorry at the choice
108. T. DYER, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE IDEA OF RACE 152 (1980).
109. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Aug. 31, 1928) in Holmes Papers, supra
note 1; quoted with some alterations in punctuation, in HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 67,
at 289; excerpted in HOWE, supra note 29, at 8 n.17 (1963).
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that he had made. 1 ° But the choice was deeply painful. At first, Holmes
reassured himself that his nephew, Ned Holmes, would carry on the
Holmes name. But, it gradually became apparent that Ned, too, had a
childless marriage, and from the 1890s onward, Holmes talked somewhat
bleakly of the extinction of his family.
At the same time, the nation was going through a severe depression
and the beginnings of violent class struggle. As a judge, Holmes began to
face his first cases involving organized labor, which to him seemed an
enemy not only of the existing order, but of everything he found valuable
in life.
Holmes extracted from these cases, and from the extinction of his fam-
ily, the same lesson that he had extracted with so much pain from the
Civil War. He did not feel much personal sympathy for the trade unions
and the new races that would displace his own, but it was his duty to
sacrifice himself, and for his race to perish, if that was what honor and
duty required. In the early 1890s, he began dissenting from the decisions
of his court, on behalf of the right of the state legislature to make experi-
ments in direct democracy and socialism. 11 This was a difficult step for
him, since he did not like to dissent, especially alone; furthermore,
although he did not like to admit that this was a factor, his dissents were
likely to cut off the prospect of eventual advancement to the Supreme
Court, the only ambition that remained to him. But in 1894, he wrote
Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 112 in which he argued that it was the duty
of judges to set aside their own personal interests, and even their fears of
extinction, in order to preside fairly over the struggle for life.
From the depths of his worst time, Holmes extracted something admi-
rable, if tragic. He turned to self-sacrifice as the fundamental moral prin-
ciple. He wrote to Ellen Curtis, describing a conversation he had had
with Fanny:
[A] recent exposition I gave ... with an excursus on suicide as the ideal
expression of that illusory personal spontaneity or independence which ex-
hibits itself in less marked forms as consideration for the weak, charity to
the poor, drunkenness, going to the play, painting pictures, etc., in short,
110. Mark DeWolfe Howe rather oddly interpreted the letter quoted in the text to mean that
Holmes had imposed a childless marriage on Fanny Dixwell in order to further his career, see id.,
but Howe was not aware of Fanny's illness.
111. See Opinions of the Justices, 160 Mass. 586, 593 (1894) (referendum, and votes for women);
Opinions of the Justices, 155 Mass. 598, 607 (1892) (municipally owned coal yards); Commonwealth
v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 123 (1892) (regulation of wage withholding).
112. Oliver W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).
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uneconomic expenditures of force-the final judgment on which by nature
is death-but which in moderate doses is the consolation and glory of
man.
1 13
Holmes's sad and generous courage, his determination to perish in the
fight rather than fight dishonorably; his determination to accept the inev-
itable, and, as Spinoza advised, to act well and joyously; these things, and
not his conventional prejudices or his brutal talk of racial hygiene, are
the core of the man and the inheritance we are entitled to receive from
him. 114
VI. HOLMES AND PRAGMATISM
From the time of Holmes's personal crisis in the 1890s, there were
clearly two components of his thought: (1) the hard-minded view that
everything in human society was ultimately the product of natural selec-
tion; and (2) a sense of higher duty that appeared to contradict his un-
derstanding of what evolution required.
His ideas developed in opposition to those that are now called pragma-
tism. In 1867, wrangling with William James, Holmes took the material-
ist position he had formulated while in winter quarters with the Union
Army in 1863 and 1864. James, who had stayed at home during the war,
was at the time a doubting idealist. Holmes tended to lump together
William James's idealism and his father's religion. Thus, when Holmes
had difficulty answering one of William's objections to materialism, he
said, "What a passion your father has in writing and talking his religion!
Almost he persuadeth me to be a Swedenborgian, but I can't go it so
far-will see whether the other scheme [materialism] busts up first, I
think."' 15
113. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Ellen Curtis (Jan. 7, 1901), in Holmes Papers, supra note
1.
114. Since writing this I have seen John Casey's PAGAN VIRTUE: AN ESSAY IN ETHICS (1990),
his effort to treat virtues like Holmes's, traced back to Classical roots, as an ethical system.
Although I sympathize with the effort, I venture no farther here than to say that Holmes's code is a
part of our Western tradition, a cautious respect for which is not a duty, as Holmes would say, but
only a necessity.
115. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to William James (Dec. 15, 1867), in James Papers, Hough-
ton Library; reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 507. The difficulty Holmes had was with vis viva,
the then mysterious quality of mechanical force. The recently discovered principle of conservation of
energy had increased the impression that force was not explicable in materialist terms, but had
independent existence. This is rather like the mystery that absorbed the previous generation, of the
manner in which gravity seemed to act at a distance with no material agency. Holmes was well
aware of both debates, and frequently compared the concepts of "rights" to the then mysterious
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As illustrated in Part III above, the other scheme never busted up.
Holmes came to think that materialism could encompass all of the phe-
nomena of life and thought. One could not speak of "brute" matter; "a
certain complex of energies can wag its tail and another can make
syllogisms."116
On the other hand, James eventually abandoned idealism for a new
doctrine, pragmatism, which was his effort to get beyond the terms of the
debate with Holmes on the one side and his father on the other. But
Holmes never saw anything more in pragmatism than the old weakness
for subjectivity that he despised.
I now see... that the aim and the end of the whole business [James's
pragmatism] is religious.... [J]ust as an automatic sweetheart wouldn't
work (the illustration is his) an automatic universe won't-or not so well as
one that has a warm God behind it, that loves and admires us. But for that
conclusion I don't think we ever should have heard from him on the sub-
ject, taking that as the significance of the whole business I make it my
bow.
117
William James's pragmatism might have been an effort to reconcile
himself to his father's religion without surrendering to it. Holmes, how-
ever, was very plain about his own position; he was a realist, equally
opposed to James's early idealism and James's later effort through prag-
matism to rise above the debate.
Richard Rorty has suggested that the terms of the philosophical dis-
cussion in English speaking countries have not much changed since
Holmes's and William James's debates:
Philosophers in the English-speaking world seem fated to end the century
discussing the same topic-realism-which they were discussing in 1900.
In that year, the opposite of realism was still idealism. But by now lan-
guage has replaced mind as that which, supposedly, stands over and against
"reality." 118
Because Holmes is on the realist side of the debate, we should probably
assess him in relation to modem antirealism and pragmatism. But first,
we must rescue Holmes from the embrace of the pragmatists. Despite
"force" of gravitation, words which did no more than rectify an imagined explanation for the behav-
ior of the data. See, eg., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Jan. 19, 1928), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 16, at 212-13.
116. Oliver W. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. RaV. 40, 43 (1918).
117. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (July 6, 1908), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETrERS, supra note 16, at 140.
118. RICHARD RoRTY, OBJECTIvrry, RELATIVISM, TRuTH 2 (1991).
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Holmes's own evident realism, which he endlessly insisted upon, and his
contempt for William James's pragmatism, many have persistently at-
tempted to portray Holmes as a pragmatist.
A. Pragmatism and Liberalism
There were two sources of the mistaken effort to portray Holmes as a
philosophic pragmatist. The first was a simple misunderstanding about
his place in the development of law. The most common judgment is that
he was one of the leaders of the supposed "revolt against formalism"-a
shift from the systematic natural law of the eighteenth century to the
empirical science of the twentieth.
Holmes viewed the law in which he was educated as unsystematic and
informal to the last degree. Blackstone was long forgotten, and the real-
ity of law in the mid-nineteenth century was that it was a trade. Even the
best of the scholarly judges had little interest in systematic thought. In
his day, Holmes's predecessor on the Supreme Court, Horace Gray, was
considered one of the great judges. Yet, Mark De Wolfe Howe's descrip-
tion, from Holmes's perspective is enlightening:
In cast of mind he was not unlike Chancellor Kent and Mr. Justice Joseph
Story, learned, in the traditional fashion of lawyers, clearheaded, after the
manner of able judges, he was a man of considerable force and capacity.
Yet his most ardent admirers admitted that his intelligence was not philo-
sophical and that his inclination to write opinions of inordinate length de-
prived them of any semblance of artistry. 119
The opinions of the courts lacked formality of thought or expression.
The law itself was a miscellaneous collection of unrelated details, justified
by judges and commentators alike as expressing an unsystematic sense of
natural justice. In American legal history, Holmes is more properly de-
scribed as assisting in the rise of formalism in judicial opinions, an insis-
tence on neutral principles and systematic thought, than in its overthrow.
The confusion apparently began with Holmes's famous attack on
"logic" when he said, "The life of the law has not been logic, it has been
experience."
Chancellor Kent's Commentaries, and the state court cases of the
1850s and 1860s, which provided Holmes's education in the common
law, were not especially logical in the sense of being systematic. While
there was a good deal of talk about natural law and the principles of
119. HOWE, supra note 29, at 116-17.
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justice, the law was a mass of unrelated details, and rested on nothing
more formal than common sense and familiar custom. Blackstone's
quasi-scientific systematization of the common law had long since van-
ished from American awareness. In Holmes's day, one rarely saw even a
reference to Blackstone unless it was an attack. When Holmes launched
his famous aphorism, he was criticizing English and German commenta-
ries (and Dean Langdell of the Harvard Law School), not American law.
More importantly, he was also criticizing the judges' habit of rationaliza-
tion, of finding seemingly logical, but unsystematic, reasons for rules
whose true explanation was historical and legislative. He criticized, in
short, the practice of supplying a veneer of deductive logic to explain
conclusions that in truth had been arrived at on other grounds.
In 1944, Felix Frankfurter's brief biography of Holmes was published
in the Dictionary of National Biography. For fifteen years this remained
the only authoritative account of Holmes's early work. Regarding
Holmes's writings, Frankfurter said that Holmes rejected "a view of the
law which regarded it as a merely logical unfolding." 120 This was easily
misunderstood. In 1944, Catherine Drinker Bowen wrote a fictionalized
group biography of Holmes and his family, in which she gave a similar
account, emphasizing the clash of progressive, modem social criticism
with the supposed dry logic of the past.
121
Naturally then, in 1947, when Morton White published Social
Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism, Holmes appeared as
a major protagonist, somewhat improbably linked with Thorstein Veblen
in a supposed attack on classical economics and formal systems of legal
thought. Works based on secondary materials continue to repeat this
judgment.122 Scholars imagine Holmes as a sort of Woodrow Wilson of
the law, smashing the highly formalized study of written constitutions
and natural law, and replacing it with an empirical, fundamentally pro-
gressive study of social policy.
This confusion was nourished by a parallel development, a conscious
effort to portray Holmes as a political liberal. John Dewey struck the
120. FELIX FRANKFURTER, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1841-1935, in DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY, reprinted in FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT
1, 11 (2d ed. 1961).
121. CATHERINE D. BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS 280-83 (1944).
122. See, e.g., GARY J. AICHELE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 112-23 (1989); G. EDWARD
WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 223 (1978).
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keynote in a remarkable article, Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind. 123
In the work, Dewey seemingly played on the ambiguity of the word "lib-
eral" to hint that Holmes's tolerance for intellectual experiments was ac-
tually political liberalism, or at least a sanction for it. This article was
reprinted in the Harvard Law Review in April, 1931. In this issue, which
was largely dedicated to Justice Holmes's ninetieth birthday celebration,
Cardozo and Frankfurter also referred to Holmes as a "liberal." Frank-
furter went to some trouble in his article to portray Holmes as a pragma-
tist, quoting from then unpublished papers of pragmatist Charles S.
Peirce, and listing Holmes's early publications, but omitting those before
1870. Thus, by either error or design, Frankfurter conveyed the impres-
sion that Holmes's first original work was influenced by discussions with
William James and Charles Peirce in the 1870s.
After Holmes's death, Felix Frankfurter continued the effort to por-
tray Holmes as a pragmatic liberal. In 1938, then-Professor Frankfurter
gave a series of public lectures on Holmes at Harvard, later publishing
them as a slim book.12 4 About to join the Supreme Court himself,
Frankfurter combined great forensic abilities and high stature as a legal
scholar with a well known, intimate twenty-year friendship with Holmes.
Frankfurter's word was taken as authoritative. In his lectures, he gave a
selective view of Holmes; he portrayed Holmes's tenure as a period of
class struggle in which the Court principally regulated the relations of
government and business. He barely mentioned any of Holmes's opin-
ions for the Court. Instead, Frankfurter largely concentrated on
Holmes's dissents in cases where the majority had struck down progres-
sive legislation. He skipped past Holmes's conservative views on politics
and economics, 125 and hinted heavily that Holmes favored the "redistri-
bution of wealth." Finally, Frankfurter concluded that in 1937, when
the Court began upholding New Deal legislation more regularly, "the old
views of Mr. Justice Holmes began to be the new constitutional direction
of the Court."' 1 26
By 1941, with the Court dominated by Roosevelt appointees, Robert
H. Jackson wrote, "Justices such as Holmes and Brandeis have not only
123. 53 NEW REPUBLIC 210 (1928), reprinted in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 33 (Felix Frankfurter
ed., 1931).
124. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1938).
125. Except for a single sentence: Frankfurter said that Holmes "personally 'disbelieved all the
popular conceptions of socialism,' and came dangerously close to believing in the simplicities of the
wage fund theory." Id. at 44. This hardly seems an adequate exposition of Holmes's views.
126. Id.
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furnished the highest expression but they have been the very source and
the intellectual leaders of recent liberalism in the United States."1
27
The picture of Holmes as a politically liberal pragmatist, alluded to by
Frankfurter and Jackson, was drawn in full colors by Philip P. Wiener,
whose well-received 1949 book, Evolution and the Founders of Pragma-
tism, devoted a chapter to Holmes. Wiener described Holmes as one of
the founders of philosophic pragmatism. He said that Holmes's "liberal
hope for reform" made him a sort of godfather to the New Deal. This
portrait was, again, reinforced by Catherine Drinker Bowen's best-selling
book,1 28 in which she simply invented accounts of Holmes's meetings
with the actual founders of pragmatism, Charles Peirce and William
James, complete with dialogue in which the new philosophy was
invented. 129
The political effort to portray Holmes as a liberal, in the sense of a
127. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 312 (1941); see also
MAX LERNER, IDEAS FOR THE ICE AGE 100-01 (1941); quoted in SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, THE
LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS 7 (1956).
128. BOWEN, supra note 121.
129. Id. at 220-21. The shred of fact on which all these accounts were based, which Frankfurter
had exhumed from the Peirce papers in 1930, was Charles S. Peirce's description, late in his unhappy
life, of a "Metaphysical Club," at one of the regular meetings at which Peirce claimed to have read a
paper introducing pragmatism for the first time to William James, Holmes, and other lesser lights
who thereafter followed up on the central idea. Max Fisch accepted this account, and put Holmes
among the founders of pragmatism, on the theory that he had been present at the early meetings of
the Metaphysical Club. M.H. Fisch, Justice Holmes, The Prediction Theory of Law, and Pragma-
tism, 39 J. PHIL. 85 (1942). Bowen then dramatized these supposed meetings of the club in her book
in 1944. See BOWEN, supra note 121. Finally, Philip P. Weiner organized his influential book,
EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM (1949), around the image of the meetings of the
Metaphysical Club. As Wiener himself noted, however, there is no evidence in the voluminous
papers of the others involved that there was such a club or that Peirce read such a paper. There were
occasional meetings of friends in William James's house in Cambridge, beginning in the spring of
1870, but Holmes stopped visiting James very shortly thereafter, and the others had not yet in fact
developed any of the ideas which later came to be called pragmatism. Holmes first encountered
pragmatism in William James's writings of the 1890s, when he thought very little of it. The facts are
not in dispute. See WIENER, supra, at 18-25; NOVICK, supra note 6, at 27 n.4; Thomas C. Grey,
Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 app. at 864-70 (1989). Morton White, Wie-
ner, Grey, and most other commentators do not rest any of their weight on the historical accuracy of
Peirce's story, but use it as a convenient image:
The most significant fact for the historian of thought is that Peirce brought together in his
account of the genesis of pragmatism a historically important group of persons who really
lived in the same place and time, moved in the same intellectual atmosphere, and influ-
enced each other in ways that shaped the growth of certain pervasive ideas current in our
thinking today.
WIENER, supra, at 25-26. I should have thought "the most significant" fact about Peirce's story, for
any sort of historian, was that it was substantially untrue.
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social democrat, collapsed in the 1940s. A backlash from liberals them-
selves began soon after the first volumes of Holmes's letters were pub-
lished, in 1943, in which Holmes's true views of politics and economics
began to appear. In 1951, the Supreme Court's decision in Dennis v.
United States130 dealt another heavy blow. The Court relied on
Holmes's opinion in Schenck v. United States 131 to affirm criminal con-
victions of the leaders of the Communist Party of the United States, and
seemed to ratify the Red Scare of the 1940s and 1950s, with all its ex-
cesses. It became increasingly difficult to carry Holmes at the head of the
New Deal parade.
Holmes's liberal credentials were finally withdrawn, as it were, by Sa-
muel Konefsky, in an influential book, The Legacy of Holmes and Bran-
deis, published in 1956. Konefsky assumed that Holmes and Brandeis
were responsible for the new thinking in the Supreme Court after 1937,
"The constitutional ideology to which the Supreme Court as reorganized
by Franklin D. Roosevelt was heir." '32 But, Konefsky easily showed
that Holmes's private views contradicted the policies of the New Deal.
Since Holmes's influence on the later Court, as in the First Amendment
cases, at times was mediated by Brandeis's opinions, Konefsky argued
that Holmes had no real ideas of his own, in any case, only unreflective
prejudices. For instance, Holmes's views on economics were supposedly
just unexamined prejudices carried forward from his youth; "clear and
present danger" was just a casual remark, a rationalization to uphold
criminal convictions, that did not become a rationale for protecting free-
dom of speech until Brandeis lent his "powerful support." '33
There was a heavy air of suggestion about the study that Brandeis was
the true source of the ideas and the dissents from which Frankfurter had
fashioned his portrait of Holmes.13 4
The criticism of Holmes continued. Judge Learned Hand, who gave
the Holmes Lectures at Harvard in 1958,135 devoted part of one lecture
to attacking Holmes's version of the clear and present danger, comparing
130. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
131. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
132. KONEFSKY, supra note 127.
133. Id. at 202.
134. David Rabban amplified this suggestion into a fully developed theory that axabal of liberal
law professors manipulated Holmes. David M. Rabban, The Emergence of First Amendment Doc-
trine, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1205, 1211 (1983). But see Novick, supra note 32.
135. Judge Learned Hand, Lecture at Harvard University (1958), in THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1958).
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it unfavorably with his own objective test of incitement. 136 Justice Wil-
liam 0. Douglas, in a separate opinion, objecting to the majority's revival
of Holmes's clear and present danger doctrine in Brandenburg v. Ohio,
approvingly cited Hand's book as authority for the violent attack on
Holmes's standard that has continued to this day.
137
The effort to make Holmes a pragmatic liberal therefore seems to have
self-destructed. The original puffery and the later revisionism have effec-
tively canceled each other out.
A more authentic effort has emerged in recent years, without any ap-
parent political agenda, to show that Holmes's jurisprudence, rather than
his overall philosophy, is consistent with some forms of pragmatism.
Holmes believed that law was an instrument of social purposes; that
lawyers like scientists tried to predict behavior (of judges); and that
judges necessarily looked outside the law for useful grounds of decision.
These aspects of Holmes's thought are certainly consistent with some
forms of pragmatism, and one can hardly argue with the proposition that
Holmes is one of the founders of legal pragmatism, in this limited
sense. 138
Henry Steele Commager, in The American Mind, gave a very clear
account of Holmes's approval of legal "pragmatism," in the sense of so-
cial experimentation. Commager emphasized that Holmes's personal
philosophy was quite different from the one he saw working itself out in
the law.139 Perry Miller and Edmund Wilson both categorized Holmes
as one of those who introduced "scientific" or evolutionary thinking into
what was eventually termed the social sciences. This seems a fair enough
appraisal, consistent with the view that Holmes fostered legal pragma-
tism, as long as too much actual resemblance between Holmes's thinking
and the biology of evolution is not required.
Richard A. Posner has also viewed Holmes as a founder of modem
legal pragmatism. By legal pragmatism, Judge Posner means "a future-
oriented instrumentalism that tries to deploy thought as a weapon to en-
able more effective action."" 4  Not unlike what Holmes said a judge
136. Id. at 58-61. There was a certain irony in this. In Dennis, the Court relied on Hand's own
statement of the clear-and-present-danger standard to affirm the convictions of the Communist lead-
ers. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
137. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 454 (1969).
138. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 26-30, 221-25 (1990).
139. HENRY S. COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 359 (1950).
140. See POSNER, supra note 138, at 28 (quoting Cornel West's description of philosophic prag-
matism in THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 5 (1989)).
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went through when deciding a case, this milder, eclectic pragmatism has
replaced notions of hard science, as something law can aspire to, in the
thinking of those who believe that law is or should be an instrument of
social purpose. To this extent, it is in accord with Holmes's views and
can legitimately claim him as a forebear.
But it is important to remember, if we are to understand his opinions
and not just The Common Law, that Holmes was not a philosophic prag-
matist. Professor Thomas C. Grey, however, in an important and
lengthy article, 4 ' argued that Holmes's personal philosophy was a prag-
matism like John Dewey's.
Grey anchors his argument in the genuine contradiction in Holmes's
writings, between Holmes's view that law was only an instrument of so-
cial policy, and the uneconomic idealism that Holmes recommended in
his addresses to young lawyers. Grey called this a conflict between the
"witness" and the "actor" in Holmes, echoing Rogat's criticism of
Holmes as a "spectator." 142
Professor Grey's terms are a little judgmental, especially when he
frankly sided with the pragmatist common law of Holmes's youth and
commented that the Olympian judge of his old age was a failure. But
Grey did notice the apparent contradiction between Holmes's own prac-
tice and the qualities Holmes ascribed to the ordinary lawyer and judge.
Grey said, reasonably enough, that Holmes tried to reconcile these
qualities-the transcendent point of view required of the theoretician,
and the perspective of the actor in the struggle who must take sides.
Holmes, as discussed above, reconciled them by saying that each was an
expression of something more fundamental: the evolution of the human
species. Grey asserted that Holmes's efforts to reconcile the contradic-
tion were just a weak anticipation of Dewey's pragmatism.143 Although
this may be true, it is a question of how one understands Dewey."
141. Grey, supra note 129.
142. Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 213 (1964).
143. Grey wrote that when Holmes read Dewey's EXPERIENCE AND NATURE he reacted with
"unmediated enthusiasm" and "wrote at once to Laski, 'I thought [it] truly a great book.'" Id. at
868-70. As the letter to Pollock quoted in the text illustrates, this slightly exaggerates Holmes's
reaction, who at first disliked the book and had to be urged to read it again and to give it another
chance.
144. Dewey's followers differ radically among themselves as to what Dewey meant to say. Grey,
for instance, adopted a representational theory of truth. Grey, supra note 129, at 803-04. However,
Rorty claimed this was the antithesis of his own philosophy (and I would have thought it inconsis-
tent with any sort of pragmatism). Rorty rejected the "scientistic, method-worshipping side" of
Dewey that Grey admired. Id.; Grey, supra note 129, at 803-04. Rorty, on the other hand, said that
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Unlike more recent pragmatists, Dewey advanced a metaphysics in
which there was a suggestion of objective reality lying behind the phe-
nomena of experience; and Holmes heard in this an echo of his old friend
the Cosmos. As Holmes wrote to Frederick Pollock,
But although Dewey's book [Experience and Nature] is incredibly ill writ-
ten, it seemed to me after several rereadings to have a feeling of intimacy
with the inside of the cosmos that I found unequaled. So methought God
would have spoken had He been inarticulate but keenly desirous to tell you
how it was. 145
To Holmes, the inductive methods of natural science gave the only
true knowledge, and behind them he heard a hint of the ultimate. This
seems to be what Holmes found in Dewey; but in any case there is no real
doubt about Holmes's own ideas. Grey wanted Holmes to understand
Dewey as he and Richard Rorty did, however, as denying to natural sci-
ence any favored position, rejecting its claim to have a preferred method
for arriving at truth, and rejecting any belief in in an ultimate reality.
Rorty puts the position this way:
[P]ragmatists would like to drop the idea that human beings are responsible
to a nonhuman power. We hope for a culture in which questions about the
"objectivity of value" or the "rationality of science" would seem equally
unintelligible. Pragmatists would like to replace the desire for objectivity-
the desire to be in touch with a reality which is more than some community
with which we identify ourselves-with the desire for solidarity with that
community. They think that the habits of relying on persuasion rather than
force, of respect for the opinions of colleagues, of curiosity and eagerness
for new data and ideas, are the only virtues which scientists have. They do
not think that there is an intellectual virtue called "rationality" over and
above these moral virtues. 146
Nothing in Holmes's writings directly supports such a view. The fol-
lowing is more characteristic: "When the.., man said Europe has given
us the steam engine, Asia every religion that ever commanded the rever-
ence of mankind-I answered I bet on the steam engine. For the steam
engine means science and science is the root from which comes the
he and his teacher Sidney Hook also differed fundamentally in their reading of Dewey. RoRTY,
supra note 118, at 17 n.30.
145. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 15, 1931), in 2 HOLMES-POL-
LOCK LETTERs, supra note 16, at 287.
146. RORTY, supra note 118, at 39. This is plainly Grey's version of pragmatism as well, see
Grey, supra note 129, at 789-91. I quote the Rorty passage, which was published after Grey's arti-
cle, as a succinct and authoritative statement of the school to which he seeks to assimilate Holmes.
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flower of our thought."147 Overall, it is difficult to imagine a more direct
and violent contrast than that between Holmes's philosophy of scientific
realism, his utter acceptance of the nonhuman power of the material
world, and Rorty's pragmatism, the gentle pragmatism Professor Grey
found in John Dewey. However one feels about this pragmatism,
Holmes did not share it.
VII. HOLMES'S PLACE IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
Holmes, like Leslie Stephen, was a principal figure in the Victorian
attempt to invent a rationalist morality, a scientific replacement for
religion. 148
Holmes believed that "science"-by which he meant inductive reason-
ing, as opposed to revelation-was the only route to truth. Holmes's
project, like Stephen's, was to find a scientific explanation for duty. In
his earliest writings149 he said that it was the task of his generation to do
so. He said later that his transition to adult thinking was marked by
reading R. A. Vaughan's Hours With the Mystics, an evolutionary ac-
count of religion.150 From the time of his Civil War notebooks, he be-
lieved that moral principles were only another aspect of the fundamental
laws of the material world:
Of course when I thought I was dying the reflection that the majority vote
of the civilized world declared that with my opinions I was en route for
Hell came up with painful distinctness-Perhaps the first impulse was trem-
ulous-but then I said-by Jove, I die like a soldier anyhow-I was shot in
the breast doing my duty up to the hub-afraid? No, I am proud.... Then
came in my Philosophy-I am to take a leap in the dark-but now as ever I
believe that whatever shall happen is best-for it is in accordance with a
general law-and good & universal (or general law) are synonymous terms
in the universe. 151
147. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (June 1, 1919), in I HOLME-LASKI LET-
TERS, supra note 37, at 210. It is possible to interpret "science" to mean only what Rorty means.
However, I think the more natural reading is that the steam engine is like Samuel Johnson's kick at a
stone in a similar context: "I refute him thus"
148. See ANNAN, supra note 23.
149. Holmes, supra note 17; Holmes, supra note 18.
150. See NOvICK, supra note 6, at 28.
151. OLIVER W. HOLMES, TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLI-
VER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 1861-1864, 27-28 (Mark DeW. Howe ed., 1946). This account of
Holmes's injury at the battle of Ball's Bluff, in October 1861, was written in one of Holmes's pocket
diaries, probably during the time when he had become an aide de camp and was at leisure in winter
quarters, during the winter of 1863-64, when Holmes was trying to extract philosophy from the
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Emerson provided inspiration for this quest for the good and universal.
Holmes's whole career of study of the common law, which he believed
was the record of evolving morality, was a search for the underlying prin-
ciples of history and hence of the good. Holmes was proudest of his
thinking when it arrived at results substantially the same, he imagined, as
"prevailing theological notions." He regularly described his own views
as a sort of advanced religion.'52 He admired the Japanese, in part, be-
cause he thought that Shinto and Bushido were moral codes, like his
own, freed from belief in a personal god. He gave his eschatology in a
memorial for his friend and mentor George 0. Shattuck. In the eulogy
he spoke also of himself:
Sooner or later the race of men will die; but we demand an eternal record.
We have it. What we have done is woven forever into the great vibrating
web of the world. The eye that can read the import of its motion can deci-
pher the story of all our deeds, of all our thoughts. To that eye I am con-
tent to leave the recognition and the memory of this great head and
heart. 15
3
In this rationalist Calvinism, a sort of scientific Buddhism, Holmes felt
that he had found fundamental principles that would explain and recon-
cile him to duty. Henry Adams, in his similar quest for the fundamental
principles of human life, looked to physics for analogies, and tried to
work through a calculus of energies that would explain the pattern of
history. Holmes, like Leslie Stephen, looked to evolution. Stephen had
studied the history of philosophy itself, and the biographies of the great
thinkers, in a vain search for the deeper principles of the universal.
Holmes used the data of the law, the decisions of the judges, in the same
way, to expose the evolution of language and thought. But, unlike Ad-
experiences of the war. He added after the quoted passage: "I can now add that our phrase good
only means certain general truths seen through the heart & will instead of being merely contem-
plated intellectually." Id. at 28.
152. In a letter to Alice S. Green, Holmes wrote:
I felt ashamed of my own egotisms-not too much, because I [am] too sincerely sceptical
not to see them as a bait with which nature gets work out of men. Real skepticism builds
all its arrogance on humility and I think with only a seeming paradox might be said to be
the most religious of attitudes.
Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Feb. 7, 1909), in Holmes Papers, supra note 1, at
B43 F12.
"No doubt I have said before that I think a real sceptic ([Holmes himself,] who hasn't reserved a
little Godhood for himself) may come nearer to what I should call religion than most if not all of
those who go to church." Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 7, 1927), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERs, supra note 16, at 207-08.
153. George 0. Shattuck, in HOLMES, supra note 2, at 70, 74.
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ams or Stephen, Holmes felt that he had succeeded in finding principles
that, if not ultimate, were true, and as nearly universal as the thought of
his own time was capable of achieving.
Holmes, because of the nature of his quest, was an important spokes-
man for the realist side in the great philosophical debate of his age. He
hoped that philosophical investigation would ultimately justify his faith
in the material world and the purposes of the cosmos, but he tried to set
aside his merely personal needs during the investigation. He stuck as
rigorously as possible to the evidence, and tried to see arguments in a dry
light. Accordingly, today one still finds in Holmes's abstract thought the
fundamental impulse of realist philosophy, the "human need to stand
outside all needs," the need for "transcendence," that Richard Rorty
quite properly said was the enemy of pragmatism.154 It was a chivalric
quest that, in itself, as Holmes was perfectly aware, represented a deep
European tradition.
Holmes's philosophy required him to try to escape the limits of subjec-
tivity, to escape the "illusion" of self, and to assume the perspective of
the cosmos as far as possible. This involved him in the same problems
and paradoxes as his effort, as a judge, to stand outside the evolution of
the law.
To examine this double perspective more closely: Holmes believed
there were two sorts of duty, the duties imposed on everyone, even on a
bad man, by the power of the State; and the self-imposed duties of a
gentleman.1 55 He did not like to use terms like "duty" in discussing law
because he did not want to confuse these two senses of the word.
Stating this division of duties in such a blunt way, one correctly gives
Holmes's view, and at the same time understands that he could not have
spoken in the same blunt terms. A gentleman was not to speak of money
or personal morals; and it would hardly have been polite or tactful to
contrast his own standards with those of the "crowd." As it was in
nearly every one of his speeches, the point had to be made gracefully.
Addressing Harvard seniors, Holmes described the dominant forces in
the community of his day, the makers of law, and contrasted their code
with the idealism of the gentleman:
The society for which many philanthropists, labor reformers, and men of
fashion unite in longing is one in which they may be comfortable and may
154. RORTY, supra note 118, at 8.
155. See Holmes, supra note 69, in which he recommended to his audience of presumed gentle-
men the higher path of autonomous duty.
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shine without much trouble or any danger .... Most of my hearers would
rather that their daughters or sisters should marry a son of one of the great
rich families than a regular arrmy officer, were he as beautiful, brave, and
gifted as Sir William Napier ....
Who is there who would not like to be thought a gentleman? Yet what
has that name been built on but the soldier's choice of honor rather than
life? ... who of us could endure a world, although cut up into five-acre lots
and having no man upon it who was not well fed and well housed, without
the divine folly of honor, without the senseless passion for knowledge out-
reaching the flaming bounds of the possible, without ideals the essence of
which is that they never can be achieved?
156
Law was the expression of an evolving morality, imposed by the domi-
nant forces in society on all. The records of the law showed that this
mass morality had progressed from unconscious, subjective impulses
such as the territorial instinct and the impulse to take revenge for inju-
ries, to a more highly evolved, conscious instrumentalism that aimed for
the survival of "racial" values, within the limits imposed by precedent
and enlightened sympathy.157
The gentleman's duty evidently was of a higher order than these mini-
mal standards meant to apply to all. The gentleman's duty was to ad-
vance his ideals through frankly uneconomic expenditures, risking death
or failure in warfare, science, art, or jurisprudence. If a judge was a gen-
tleman, he sat above the struggle for life, setting aside his own loyalties,
and helped in small ways to advance the purposes of cosmic evolution.
This self-sacrificing idealism was implanted by the evolutionary process
itself, of course, just as the humbler, prudential sort of duty had been,
although Holmes could not divine its purpose.
Analyzing these ideas in more modem terms, it is helpful to compare
them to Michael Oakeshott's, which are similar in some ways.
Oakeshott also described two distinct moral systems, reflected in two dis-
tinct ideas of the state, each embedded in European language and
thought. Modem European states resemble one of these forms, which
Oakeshott called an "enterprise association." The enterprise association
is a voluntary association of persons who agree to submit themselves to
the power of the state. Its purpose is to achieve some common goal of
the persons who form it. In its British and American versions it some-
156. The Soldier's Faith, in HOLMES, supra note 2, at 59.
157. This evolutionist morality was different in detail, but not in spirit, from the other scientific
morality of Holmes's day, utilitarianism, which also tried to discover the mechanism that had trans-
lated private self-seeking into public codes of behavior.
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what resembles a corporation organized to exploit the natural resources
within its territory, for the common benefit of its members. The state as
enterprise association educates and commands its citizens to follow rules
of behavior whose purpose is to attain their common goal.
The second idea of the state is the civic association. In Oakeshott's
view the civic association does not presently exist; it is an ideal based to
some extent on qualities of the old regimes. While it is also a voluntary
association, the persons who form a civic association do not agree to sur-
render their freedom. The purpose of this state is to maintain a different
sort of law, a set of rules that mediate the dealings among its citizens in
such a way as to resolve disputes and facilitate "conversation," the com-
plex interaction of free persons, without depriving them of autonomy.
The two forms of association correspond to the two conflicting themes
in Holmes's writings. The enterprise association looks very similar to
Holmes's realm of ordinary law, the society of prudent, bad men. The
instrumental rules through which enterprise associations exercise their
power are similar to the instrumental common law that Holmes de-
scribed. Oakeshott erred when he expressly criticized Holmes's view
that judges make law. 158 He seems to believe that judges need do no
more than interpret the words of a statute in a new setting. However,
with that qualification, which does not alter anything that is central to
Oakeshott's ideas,' 59 Holmes's view of the rules of behavior created by
the common law appears identical to Oakeshott's view of the enterprise
association.
On the other hand, Holmes's fundamental principles of the Federal
Constitution are a set of essentially moral rules that require fair adjudica-
tion of disputes and that protect open discourse among free individuals.
These rules look remarkably like an example of Oakeshott's civic associa-
tion, his idealized "rule of law."
158. Michael Oakeshott, The Rules of Law, in ON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 119, 147
(1983), misquoting Holmes's Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 105, at 461: "[J]udges
are called upon to exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice." Oakeshott has "arbitrary choice."
159. It is essential to Oakeshott that in the rule of law, judges only interpret law that has been
previously enacted by a process agreed upon among the members of the civic association. Therefore,
judges may not make law in the sense that they do in the enterprise association, by choosing in
accordance with social policies. In the civic association, as in Holmes's Federal Constitution, how-
ever, it seems perfectly reasonable that judges would build up a body of precedent interpreting the
fundamental principles of enacted law, as well as the enactments themselves. As a result, they would
make law in Holmes's sense but still act in accordance with agreed upon principles of the constitu-
tion and hence with Oakeshott's requirements.
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Finally, Holmes's view of his own duty as a judge is like Oakeshott's
description of a judge in the idealized civic association, who resolves dis-
putes in accordance with enacted law,1" without regard to himself or the
practical interests of the parties. 161
In his most comprehensive presentation of these ideas,162 Oakeshott
repeatedly insisted that the two systems were incompatible: membership
in an enterprise association was inconsistent with membership in a civic
association. The qualities that lead a person to join one association or
the other, and the purposes of the two types of association, are incompat-
ible. This may be true, but Oakeshott's earlier writings, which were
more detailed in this area, hinted at how the two systems might coexist,
and indeed might depend on each other.
The most interesting of Oakeshott's works for a student of Holmes is
his account of Thomas Hobbes's writings.1 63 The Leviathan is the proto-
typical enterprise association. People associate themselves out of weak-
ness, to end the state of perpetual war and to achieve their common
purposes. The association is prudent, and while it deprives citizens of the
excitement of victory it provides the more moderate pleasures supplied
by peace. Leviathan is based on
the morality of the tame man, the man who has settled for safety and has no
need of nobility, generosity, magnanimity or an endeavour for glory in or-
der to move him to behave justly. And, in so far as this was Hobbes's view,
he has been recognized as the philosopher of a so-called 'bourgeois'
morality. 164
This passage is very similar to Holmes's description of bourgeois society,
which he contrasted with the gentleman's idealism, in his address to
160. Here again the question of whether judges may make law appears. In the civic association,
unlike the enterprise association, the rule of law is a system of moral principles. In my view, the
fundamental principles Holmes found in the common law and the Constitution are such a system.
While Oakeshott's judge makes law only in the sense of establishing rules for new situations, he need
not reach outside the system of principles found in previously enacted law; and Holmes rarely, if
ever, did.
161. This brief summary does not do justice to the richness of Oakeshott's ideas or to the many
points of similarity in Holmes's writings. It is interesting to note that Oakeshott, who is certainly no
stranger to the common law tradition, has also said that the "civic association" is most clearly
described by "Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel," the same writers, except Fichte,
whose direct or indirect influence was most important to Holmes. MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, ON
HUMAN CONDUCT 252 (1975).
162. Id.
163. Michael Oakeshott, The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes, in RATIONALISM IN
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 248 (1962).
164. Id. at 293.
[Vol. 70:703
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/2
JUSTICE HOLMES'S PHILOSOPHY
Harvard seniors. Oakeshott, too, further contrasted the morality of the
tame man with an "aristocratic" '165 morality. Quoting Hobbes, he said
that the latter is the morality of the "just" man, who subscribes to law,
not out of weakness but out of disdain for personal consequences.
" 'That which gives to human actions the relish of justice,'" as opposed
to mere prudence, "'is a certain Nobleness or Gallantness of courage
(rarely found), by which a man scorns to be beholden for the content-
ment of life, to fraud or breach of promise. This justice of Manners, is
that which is meant, where justice is called a virtue.' "166
The just man, the man of pride, is certainly also the free individual, the
man who knows how to be his own friend, who joins in a civic associa-
tion to preserve his autonomy. His laws are the higher order "rule of
law" that resemble Holmes's own code.
Oakeshott believes that the just man, the man of aristocratic virtue, is
Hobbes's own ideal. Just as Oakeshott showed an apparent contradic-
tion between Hobbes's private morality and his prescriptions for the
state, 167 one must face the similar conflict in Holmes.
Although Oakeshott stated the two codes of morality are fundamen-
tally inconsistent, and cannot be held by the same person, he hinted that
they might coexist in the same society. In his essay on the rule of law,
for instance, he seemed to accept that a national or federal government
might be a civic association governed by the rule of law, while smaller
units or local "governments" might be enterprise associations devoted to
specific purposes.
16 8
Another, even more interesting, hint was his suggestion that the just
man is needed to form any kind of voluntary association. If the social
165. Id. at 294.
166. Id. at 290-91 (quoting Hobbes's Leviathan).
167. Oakeshott really gave two answers to the apparent contradiction (rejecting, as unlikely, a
third, that Hobbes was simply careless in this thinking). The first, which is not discussed in the
accompanying text, is that Hobbes advanced two doctrines, only one of which he thought was true.
In this view, Hobbes was a propagandist for the existing order of his day; and hence Leviathan was
written in an idiom likely to be familiar to his intended audience. But Hobbes had a second purpose,
to explore the implications of his own philosophy; and the result was a set of writings that embodied
two doctrines, one open, and the other purposely hidden from all but the initiated. Id. at 286-88.
Oakeshott noted that some will have difficulty accepting the premise that Hobbes had an esoteric
doctrine inconsistent with his open meaning. I decline to address this question, because Oakeshott
also hinted that the two may not be in conflict, as discussed in the accompanying text. In such a
case, then, there is no reason, other perhaps than tact, for one to be hidden.
168. See Oakeshott, supra note 158, at 163. Oakeshott insisted that local authorities should not
be called "governments" at all, and that local "rates" proportioned to the benefit provided should
not be confused with "taxes" to support a general government.
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contract is to have legitimate authority, it must be possible at least to
imagine its coming into being through voluntary agreement. It is hard to
imagine the weak, fearful, ordinary man for whom it is created volunta-
rily undertaking the risks necessary to bring it into being. Oakeshott
hinted that the just man, the man of pride rather than fear, is needed to
make even the enterprise association conceivable. 16
9
Now, certainly, Holmes's Federal Constitution is a great deal like
Oakeshott's rule of law. This is not to suggest that the actual federal
government in Holmes's day resembled Oakeshott's ideal civic associa-
tion, but only that the fundamental principles which Holmes thought
were embodied in the Constitution were themselves an ideal order like
the one Oakeshott described.
State and local governments, on the other hand, with their instrumen-
tal purposes, were like Oakeshott's local authorities. The flourishing of
all these lower levels of society, with their prudent concerns and their
striving for the mediocre, depended on protection of their freedom by a
higher order of government. In this order, freedom and autonomy are
valued more than all the other aims of legislation, more than the exist-
ence of the federal government itself.
Holmes was not quite clear how or why evolution should have pro-
duced this higher standard of morality. He simply accepted that, like
everything else, it was a product of the natural world. In the end,
Holmes accepted his own morality, as well as the prudence of the bad
man, as a necessary part of the world, no more explainable or accounta-
ble for than a taste for beer, but no less real.
The conflict in his thought, which he resolved with a faith in the cos-
mos that he could not justify, was created solely by the machinery of the
evolutionary process as he understood it. If laws were made by a domi-
nant power, considered as an entity, a sort of collective organism or
"race," natural selection would favor the power whose laws were best
calculated to ensure survival. Laws and lawmakers that did not ensure
the survival of the fittest would be swept away. There was no place in
this system for a judge who decided which power would prevail, and so
sat outside the struggle for life.
But today, scientists do not believe that biological evolution proceeds
in this way, as a contest between races. If an analogous evolution of
competing cultures does exist, we have no hint as yet of how it operates;
169. Oakeshott, supra note 163, at 294-300.
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and there is no particular reason to think that it works as Holmes
imagined. He was unable to remove himself from his own picture of the
struggle for survival, only because this conventional view was seared into
the fabric of his thought by the Civil War.
Today, we are more familiar with arguments that altruistic traits
might have evolved through natural selection. Modem genetics suggests
that an individual might very well sacrifice himself for the sake of others
who carry the same genes; his sacrifice on behalf of others might increase
the frequency of a particular gene in the population. Indeed, even in
Holmes's day, if he had not been so blinded by the picture of warring
races, it might have occurred even to this lonely, childless man that a
self-sacrificing sense of duty was simply the instinct of a parent.
Therefore, instead of being too greatly troubled by the apparent con-
tradiction in Holmes's thought, we may evaluate his system of duties for
what it was: a moral code based on a life devoted to duty. The code was
an elitist, paternalistic morality, but Holmes was no snob. He thought
that only the poverty caused by the excess of population over resources
kept the majority of people from attaining the same heights as the fortu-
nate minority. But the minority's good fortune did allow them to rise to
heights of idealism on which, paradoxically, the whole of society de-
pended. Refusing to believe in the institutions of peerage and monarchy,
he showed in his later opinions that he thought America's open, demo-
cratic society, with its complex federal system, its political experiments in
the insulated chambers provided by the states, was the most highly
evolved social organism yet to appear; but an elite corps was an essential
part of it. "I have read Plato's Laws [Holmes remarked]-unreal atmos-
phere with some real flashes of lightning. They had clear notions of what
a gentleman should be.' 170
170. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (July 27, 1931), in 2 HOLMES-POL-
LOCK LETrERS, supra note 16, at 293.
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